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PREFACE
This dissertation is about success in urban education. It is also
about the factors which militate against success—lethargy, pessimism,
fear, bureaucratic indifference and white racism. Whether injustices
against poor and minority children stem from racial or class prejudice
is immaterial. In American society, poverty and racial discrimination
are intertwined. What is most important is carving new routes out of
the morass of low expectations and institutionalized failure in urban
schools
.
Each chapter looks at existing myths that serve to perpetuate fail-
ure. Chapter I examines the phenomenon of "blaming the victims." The
intellectual myths of "the culture of poverty," "the disadvantaged," and
racial inferiority are scrutinized, along with their impact on educa-
tional research, policy, and practices.
Chapter II challenges the myth that integration—and bussing in
particular—cannot work. In light of current political agitation to com-
bat bussing, examining the role of leadership in seeking positive solu-
tions to racial separation is timely.
Chapter III presents numerous examples of success in urban schools.
Enough Kozol-tvpe horror stories have been written. Some urban schools
succeed; some teachers and administrators care and are effective: manv
ghetto children are achieving as well as or better than their middle-
class peers.
iii
Chapter IV explores some non-public and non-school alternatives,
from street academies to Sesame Street
,
that have potential impact in
urban education. Each example has challenged the myth that private citi-
zens and non-professionals cannot change the educational status quo.
Chapter V examines educational change theory and draws some conclu-
sions about successful change processes. Two related myths are ques-
tioned: (1) the myth that a recipe for change can be formulated; and
(2) the myth of powerlessness. Combating all these myths requires
creating an illusion of power based on the hope factor that life can be
better and that people’s actions can make a difference.
In preparing this dissertation, my most valuable resource has been
my experience as a. member of the Center for Urban Education. Through
participating in the growth of the Center from "a sign on the door to
an integrated group of over sixty-five graduate students and faculty
and over 450 undergraduates in teacher training and Career Opportunities
Programs, I have learned most about urban education and the hope
factor .
"
I would like to thank, first of all. Associate Dean Atron A.
Gentry, member of my dissertation committee and Director of
the Center
for Urban Education during its developing years. Atron
Gentry has taught
us all the meaning of "the hope factor."
Professor Byrd L. Jones, present Director of the Center
and my
major advisor, has been the source of many insights, a tough
critic of
my ideas, and a crucial support in the research
and writing of this
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paper. I would like to thank John 'C. Woodbury, Assistant to the
Chancellor of New York City Schools and former member of the Center.
Jack supported me in my first contributions to the Center and opened
many doors for me in New York in researching this dissertation.
Assistant Professor Glenn Hawkes and Associate Provost Robert L.
Woodbury, advisors for my dissertation, have both provided skillful criti-
cism and warm support. Associate Professor Reg Damerell has been a unique
source of insight as author of an outstanding book on integration and
as a member of my advisory committee.
I would also like to thank the students and staff in the Center
for Urban Education who assisted in the typing and editing of this paper:
Jo-Ann Pimental, Diane Briggs, Libby Parke, and Richard Schaye. Many
individuals actively involved in the challenge of improving urban educa-
tion offered their time and their experiences in interviews. Their con-
tributions are cited in the bibliographical essay.
CCP
March, 1972
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—the answer to the question of the
best way to teach "the disadvantaged"
is embarrassingly simple—namely, to
teach them with the same expectations
the same acceptance of their humanity
and their educability and, therefore,
with the same effectiveness as one
would teach the more privileged child
Kenneth Clark
New York Times
,
January 17, 1970
CHAPTER I
MYTHS AND ISSUES IN URBAN EDUCATION
Any study of urban education must begin with the recognition that
the distinctive features of inner city teaching and learning result
from institutionalized white racism. In the United States, dominant
classes have both actively devised and passively maintained institution-
alized forms of oppression for poor and minority citizens. Schools have
served as primary instruments for the inequality which further condemns
minorities to poverty. Discrimination is so ingrained in social behav-
ior and institutions that it can survive without conscious intent to
oppress. Maintaining the status quo suffices for white Americans.
A peculiar dynamic has occurred when white liberal reformers have
tried to discuss white racism. While identifying the patterns of dis-
crimination— specifically the failures of urban schools to educate
children— they have felt it necessarv to prescribe a general cure. But
too often their remedies have misplaced the responsibility on the
minority populations and have become another variety of "blaming the
victim." Most solutions and panaceas for the crisis in urban education
have rested on myths, generated bv white liberal intellectuals, which
have placed the burden of changing education on those whom the system
has failed
—
poor and minority children and their families.
The myths have been most destructive because they are partial
truths—which are inadequate as a basis for successful change
2strategies. 1 Often, they have taken pieces of truth—black children
learning in schools, poor hones provide less enriched environ-
ments, ghettoes are dangerous places to grow up in—and have turned
them into the basis for elaborate theories of social action which
avoided treating the basic forces of racism and bigotry.
Part of the motivation for accepting the myths has been the
desire for ready answers and solutions. Panaceas—from Head Start,
compensatory education, special education, and programmed learning to
decentralization—have risen on the horizon, brought fame and sometimes
fortune to their proponents, and faded into the larger storv of failure
in urban schools. It is not surprising that, after the failure of
these strategies, a Jensen would appear, propounding the biggest myth
of all—that Negroes are genetically inferior.
The myths which have preoccupied social reformers since James B.
Conant ' s Slums and Suburbs (1961) have been destructive because thev
have diverted attention from the basic underlying causes of uneaual
educational opportunity and results in urban schools. Yet to denv the
ready answers and partial truths is to raise the specter of despair.
If Head Start, compensatory education, or decentralization are not the
^Obviously "myth" means more than this definition. Anthropologist
Claude Levi-Strauss has described mvths in manv cultures as stories
that "try to explain why things are as thev are." In Virgin Land . Henrv
Nash Smith has defined mvth as "an intellectual construction that fuses
concept and emotion into an image" and that derives as "collective
representations rather than the work of a single mind." If mvths have
a functional purpose in institutionalized white racism, it is to offer
some explanation which excuses inactivity and reconciles a belief in
equality with unequal conditions.
3answer, what is? If white racism is the cause of the failure of urban
schools, how can change be realized?
While it is crucial to identify correctly the cause, solutions
may not necessarily lie with eliminating the cause (racist belief among
white Americans)
,
but in dealing directly with the results (oppressive
acts against minority and poor Americans)
. Bringing an end to white
institutionalized racism will probably not occur by waiting for a
personal "conversion" of every white American, but by changing the
status quo—by dealing with behavior, not attitudes. The overwhelming
magnitude of causes does not deny the possibility of solutions. The
dominant social attitude of white racism can be combated— if not through
one sure-fire strategy—then through a whole set of alternatives.
To put it another way, spending more money on schools does not
eradicate racism, as the practice of Southern districts to pour more
money into black segregated schools demonstrated. Yet a degrading
physical environment makes more intense the experience of discrimination
in ghetto schools. And the lack of financial incentive for good
teachers and administrators to serve in city schools lessens the hope
of ghetto communities for better educational opportunities. Fresh
paint on the walls and better teachers cannot eliminate racism, but
they can provide the hope for urban communities that education can
improve
.
41. The Culture of Poverty
The culture of poverty concept was a consistent outgrowth of urban
welfare programs and social science research. It implied that one seg-
ment of the society was sick relative to a generally healthy society.
The assumption proceeded on the idea that the ghetto— its poverty,
crime, illnesses, filth—was spontaneously maintained, if not self-
created, rather than a result of the overt and covert racism of the
larger society.
It implied that ghetto behavior was normative by choice. But how
could one describe normative behavior of people forced into a highly
abnormal environment? Was evidence of malnutrition among welfare
children the result of a culture of poverty or of a system designed to
punish children unfortunate enough to be born poor? In fact, the
behavior of ghetto, residents is a remarkably adaptive and life-affirming
response to intolerable conditions. When schools kill the interest,
motivation, and self-repect of children, they leave--a realistic and
healthy response.
The anthropologist Charles A. Valentine traced the development of
the concept of the culture of poverty that equated "nonconformity with
2
middle-class norms" with "instability and disorganization." The
influential "Moynihan Report" in 1965 called Negro Americans "not equal
to most of those groups with which they will be competing" and predicted
^Charles A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 27.
5that so long as their weak family structure persisted, "the cycle of
poverty and disadvantage will continue to repeat itself." 3
Valentine pointed out that "if there is anything that serious
scholars of culture have learned, it is not to assume that a family is
'broken' just because the official census records show no resident male
heading the household; not to jump to the conclusion that a woman is
'alone' merely because she appears on the census roles as 'deserted;' or
that a child has necessarily been 'abandoned' just because a service
agency reports that its father is absent."^ Such statistical pronounce-
ments reflected not only condescending ignorance of the life necessities
for poor and minority families, they became tools for the systematic
attack on those families.
Malcolm X's childhood (born Malcolm Little) illustrated the over-
whelming forces of a white racist society. Malcolm X's father was
murdered by white bigots. His mother worked hard to feed and cloth the
children, but was eventually forced to accept welfare. Malcolm described
the prying and condescension of the social workers:
When the state Welfare people began coming to our house, we
would come from school sometimes and find them talking with
our mother, asking a thousand questions. They acted and
looked at her, and at us, and around in our house, in a way
that had about it the feeling—at least for me— that we
were not people. In their eyesight we were just things ,
that was all. 3
3Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family : The Case for National Action
(Washington: U. S. Department of Labor, 1965), p. i.
^Valentine, Culture and Poverty , p. 35.
’Malcolm X, Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press,
1966), p. 12.
6One by one, Mrs. Little's children .were taken away from her by state
welfare agencies. She finally collapsed mentally and was hospitalized.
The story of the Little family's destruction would be registered
in the records of social welfare as a typical example of a black family’s
"social disintegration." Of the racist murder of the father and the
inhumane removal of the children, there would be no mention. Malcolm X's
prison sentence would be cited as the result of an unstable family
background
.
One white social scientist studying the so-called culture of
poverty went beyond racist assumptions and saw ghetto families in the
context of the oppressive forces they faced. In Tally's Corner
,
Elliot
Liebow portrayed the resourcefulness, courage, and despair of young
black men trapped in the Washington, D. C. ghetto economy. He told
the characteristic story of the optimistic young man who sought work,
received a subsistence-level job, faced hostility and discrimination,
was layed off or became sick, found he could not adequately support
his wife and family, and finally stopped trying.
Richard, known and respected as one of the hardest-working men on
the street had told the author: "I figure you got to get out there and
try. You got to try before you can get anything." But a few months
later, Richard saw no hope: "I've been scuffling for five years from
morning till night and my kids still don't have anything, and I don't
have anything . Where would be the motivation for Richard s chilcre..
^Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1967)
,
pp . 67-68
.
7to study hard and "get out there and try?" Unskilled jobs, as Liebow
learned, offered a dead end in advancement, permanence, or security:
"Neither hard work nor perseverance can conceivably carry the janitor
to a sit-down job in the office building he cleans up."
And this cycle of despair and poverty passed from generation to
generation, not by "cultural transmission," but "from the fact that the
son goes out and independently experiences the same failures, in the
same areas, and for much the same reasons as his father. The cycle
of poverty is perpetuated, not by a culture of poverty, but by unabated
discrimination and despair.
The bitterness and frustration with which ghetto families viewed
the culture of poverty concept put upon their lives was understandable.
One black teacher aide working in Brooklyn schools wrote:
If I created a game for people to play, and I made up all
the rules, I would be foolish not to come out on top all
the time. It*’ s as simple as that—How can we beat them
at their own game? I really don’t want to play the game
with them, but seeing that it's a must, all I wish is that
they play fair.®
In The Choice: The Issue of Black Survival in America , Samuel F.
Yette revealed the extremes to which the culture of poverty concept had
been taken. The concept ultimately became a weapon, not for understand-
ing or improving the lives of poor people, but for discovering how to
get rid of an essentially troublesome element in American society. In
^Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner , pp. 63, 223.
^Brooklyn COP paraprof essional , quoted in Urban Education : The
Hope Factor (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, to be published, Spring,
1972), p. 179 in final draft.
a memo to President Nixon shortly before the inauguration in 1969,
Moynihan defined "a clear national goal": that "the Negro lower-class
8
must be dissolved." He explained that by "lower-class" he meant "low
income, marginally employed, poorly educated, disorganized slum dwellers
who have piled up in our central cities over the past quarter century."
Moynihan' s insulting word choice was matched by his minimal expecta-
tions for these people:
They are not going to become capitalists, nor even middle-
class functionaries. But it is fully reasonable to conceive
of them being transformed into a stable working class popula-
tion: Truck drivers, mail carriers, assembly-line workers
—
people with dignity, purpose, and in the United States a very
good standard of living indeed. Common justice, and common
sense, demands that this be done.^
In the name of "common justice and common sense," Moynihan mapped out a
future of second-class citizenship for America's powerless and poor.
2. Compensatory Education
The myth of the culture of poverty would be harmless if it remained
buried in the ivory towers of academic research. But the myth (and its
corollaries) has had profound influence on federal educational programs
and local educational practices in urban districts. It has supported a
widespread belief in the concept of ghetto children as "disadvantaged"
and the tactic of compensatory education.
Again, the myth contains a portion of the truth. Children in the
inner cities are often "disadvantaged"—they are exposed to higher crime
^Samuel F. Yette, The Choice : The Issue of Black Survival jin
America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), p. 87.
9rates, drug problems, police brutality, and bureaucratic indifference.
Many have serious health problems, live in substandard housing, and,
above all, suffer the indignity of being poor and black in America.
Urban schools receive less financial resources than outlaying suburban
schools. In 1965, suburban districts spent $573 per pupil while central
city districts spent $449."^
Unequal education and economic discrimination have produced a
clear picture of racial injustice. For decades Blacks have earned an
income about 60 percent of that for whites. In inner cities, from one
quarter to close to one half of young black males are unemployed. In
New York City, "An overwhelming majority of black students do not
graduate from high school and, of those who do, a majority are reading
below the seventh grade level."''''*' To be poor and black in America is
clearly a "disadvantage."
But social reformers have seized this partial truth and placed
the blame for inadequate education on those environmental factors,
largely exonerating the schools and the larger society. The assumption
behind compensatory education is that somehow the fault is in the child
with "low aspirations" who is unable to "delay gratification" and his
parents who present "weak models of success." Such attitudes are
reflected in an essay by Bruno Bettelheim on "Teaching the Disadvan-
taged" :
10Wilson C. Riles, The Urban Education Task Force Report (New York
Praeger, Inc., 1970) p. 51.
11Urban Education: The Hope Factor , p. 8.
10
I remarked that we all -agreed on the great need to teach
these children socialized behavior... I pointed out that
the middle-class child can usually learn good manners by
observing his parents, whereas about the only way the
under-privileged child can learn them is by observing
his teachers. ^
Too many "experts" on the "disadvantaged" have felt comfortable with
such middle-class moralism. Later, in the same essay, Bettelheim
described the dilemma of the teacher who inadvertantly encouraged
ghetto children to steal money from her purse. He explained the
incident in terms of a different culture of poverty—even "morals of
poverty—morals very different from ours":
Within this culture of poverty it is perfectly all right
to take things from the out-group as long as you never
take from the in-group.
^
Even if there was a shred of truth in the statement that some children
had a different view of stealing than others, Bettelheim set up an
explanation which, instead of helping teachers overcome their middle-
class judgments, encouraged a condescending view of "those children."
How a parent felt when she heard her children described in such
terms was communicated in an interview with a ghetto parent by Robert
Coles
:
l^James C. Stone and Frederick W. Schneider, eds., Teaching In The
Inner City, A Book of Readings (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970),
p.
179'
^
l^stone and Schneider, p. 181.
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Then they take my kids to the Head Start thing, and first
thing I hear is the boys’ fingernails is dirty, and they
isn't eating the proper food, and they can't use the right
words, and the words they do use, no one can make them out...
They tell you they want to help you, but if you ask me they
want to make you into them, and leave you without a cent of
yourself left to hang on to. lZ>
The myth that labeled poor and minority children as "disadvantaged"
and "culturally handicapped" led to a variety of programs and policies
which were misdirected at best and reinforced white racism at worst.
The assumption led to lowered expectations and thereby lower educational
results. Schools have opted not to accept the challenge to educate
poor and minority children but to use environmental factors as an excuse
for inaction. "Whatever pathology may exist in Negro families,"
Martin Luther King pointed out, "is far exceeded by this social pathol-
ogy in the school system that refuses to accept a responsibility that
no one else can bear and then scapegoats Negro families for failing
to do the job." 15
Assuming that a child from the inner city was a cripple and that
his society was healthy lead to a cycle of mistakes. A child was viewed
as needing therapy, special treatment, and educational crutches. If ke
could survive such paternalistic help, then he might be ready to com-
pete with other, more advantaged children. As Charles Valentine
sarcastically phrased it, "In short, the poor must become 'middle
^Stone and Schneider, Teaching in the Inner Clty_, p. 137.
15Mart in Luther King, Jr. , Where Do We Go From Here? (New York:
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 225.
12
class,’ perhaps through ’psychiatric treatment,’ and then we shall see
what can be done about their poverty
.
Common sense, as well as some unbiased research, has challenged
the concept of "disadvantaged" children. Through the "color-blind"
eye of television, children of all backgrounds have been brought
together in the classroom of Sesame Street
. After the first year of
Sesame Street
,
Educational Testing Service researched the learning gains
of children who watched the show. The ETS report concluded that chil-
dren who watched the most, learned the most, regardless of background.
Three year olds who watched more than older four and five year olds
gained more in the skills tested. Most significantly, "children from
disadvantaged backgrounds who watched the program more than middle-class
children learned more than their advantaged peers."''"'7
When educators and bureaucrats called some children "disadvantaged,"
they said more about their own shortcomings and prejudices than about
the children's social and economic deprivation. The equality of
opportunity and results provided in the non-school setting of Sesame
Street exposed the compensatory education myth.
3. The Failure of Educational Research
Between the Supreme Court desegregation ruling (1954) and the
Coleman Report (1966)
,
educational research contributed practically
l6Charles Valentine, Culture and Poverty , p. 75.
17 Samuel Bell and Gerry Ann Bogatz, "A Summary of the Major Findings
in ’The First Year of Sesame Street: An Evaluation’, (Princeton,
New
Jersey: Educational Testing Service, October, 1970).
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nothing to illuminate what equality of education should and could be.
The Supreme Court ruled that separate educational facilities could
not be equal. It did not say that integrated facilities would neces-
sarily be equal. The conclusion most people drew from that decade of
educational research was, however, that black children could learn
only when they sat in class next to white children.
Educational research failed to clarify the issues and stimulate
reform in urban education because it refused to ask the important
questions or examine the crucial factors. Instead of considering urban
problems, researchers looked for any explanation other than white
racism to explain social phenomena in the ghettoes.
Combined with that timidity was the intellectual narrowness of
restricting research to factors that could easily be measured. Thus
the presence of an encyclopedia in the parent's home became more
important as a research variable than a teacher's belief that a child
could learn. Certainly, prejudiced beliefs and the effects of racism
are difficult to quantify and measure, but no factors are more important
in investigating the failures of urban education.
The massive, painstakingly executed Coleman Report, Equality of
Educational Opportunity
,
was a patent example of the "triumph of
18
sophisticated research design over common sense." After proving what
had already been proven, that race and ethnicity have a major effect on
achievement, Coleman adopted a standard research procedure for dealing
^William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971),
p . 43
.
14
with the gap between the achievement of black and white children. He
divided his research into the two racial groups explaining that, "When
achievement differs as much as it does between these groups, then to
analyze the groups together, without controlling for race or ethnicity
of the student, wou^d cause any school characteristics highly associated
with race or ethnicity to show a spurious relation to achievement
.
Constrained by a standard research procedure, Coleman avoided the real
question: Why does the gap exist?
Coleman found that, of the factors he measured, economic background
of students had the highest correlation with academic achievement. That
finding surprised no one. Unfortunately, Coleman and those who studied
his research usually extrapolated a cause and effect relationship
between poverty and low achievement. Since most of the poor urban
students were black, he could just as well have concluded that they did
not achieve because they were black— the conclusion that Jensen did
extract
.
Instead, Coleman adhered to the "cultural deprivation" assumption
that he and his researchers brought to the study. No attention was
given to the fact that poor black children achieved basically the same
as their white middle-class classmates in the early grades and that a
gap appeared around third grade which continued to widen in successive
years. That progressive inequality of results could hardly be explained
19James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington
G.P.O.
,
1966)
,
p. 311.
15
in terms of cultural disadvantage," family background, and home
environment
.
The follow-up study of the Coleman Report by the Civil Rights
Commission, Racial Isolation in the United States," convincingly con-
firmed the fact that compensatory education had little effect on improv-
ing educational achievement and that a strategy that produced more
equal results was integration. Again, a serious, massive research
effort discovered the obvious—that a child’s race more than anything
else determines his success in American schools. Neither study seri-
ously considered the possibility that white racism might be the primary
cause of lower achievement for black children—either because of
racially biased tools for measurement or because of the damaging
psychological effects of discrimination or because of the racial biases
of teachers.
While both research studies were well-intentioned, their conclu-
sions opened the door for racist interpretations of their findings. The
Winter, 1969, issue of the Harvard Educational Review published the
findings of Dr. Arthur Jensen that the lower I.Q. scores of Negroes
and the failure of compensatory education, plus his dubious contention
that intelligence is 80 percent inherited, all pointed to the conclusion
that Negroes are genetically inferior to whites when it comes to cogni-
tive learning.
At least on one level, Jensen did look at the question which other
studies assiduously avoided—the role of race in academic achievement.
But Jensen looked at race and ignored racism. Beyond the racist
16
conclusions of his research is the charge that they are absurdly useless
and potentially damaging. Even if it could be proven that intelligence
is largely inherited (with or without correlation to race)
,
such
knowledge could only have damaging use in classrooms, where each child
is an individual example in a wide range of capabilities. If we knew
that girls ajs a. group were inherently more intelligent than boys by
some measure such as cognitive learning, that fact would have no bearing
on whether any individual girl were more intelligent than any individual
boy. Although Jensen should have been dismissed as a travesty of aca-
demic scholarship, his impact is very much with us— the damage has been
done
.
Some research in urban education has gone beyond endless repeti-
tions of the problems, racist conclusions and faulty cause and effect
assumptions. Two similar studies by James Jones and Kenneth Clark in
Harlem, and by William Ryan in Roxbury, investigated the validity of
the theory of cultural deprivation and achieved almost identical
20
results. The design of the studies was simple. If cultural depriva-
tion was the prime cause of lower achievement, then its effects should
be observable within a population of all black or predominantly black
schools. The researchers compared two types of schools within Harlem
and Roxbury: schools where the majority of the children were from poor,
"deprived" homes, and schools where most of the children were from
stable homes which would not be called "deprived" by any measure.
^William Ryan, Blaming the Victim , pp . 53-56.
17
In both Harlem and Roxbury, the pattern of achievement was
remarkably similar. In the early grades there were no significant
differences between the presumably culturally deprived children and
the more advantaged children. But by the fifth and sixth grades, the
culturally deprived children began to fall farther and farther behind.
The most sensible conclusion to draw from these studies is that some-
thing happens to a poor and minority child within the schools or within
the larger society as he grows older which cripples his ability or
motivation.
4. Racism and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
The James and Clark study collected data on teachers’ expectations
in the Harlem schools— their views of the academic potentials of their
students and their predictions of their futures. The study concluded
that the major factor accounting for student decline in achievement was
the teachers' attitudes: "Less is expected of such pupils; they are
rewarded for poor performance, and the result is a steadily increasing
gap between what they accomplish and what pupils at their grade level
should accomplish."^ Those findings concurred with Kenneth Clark's
contention that so-called "disadvantaged" youth do not learn because
they are not taught.
The phenomenon of lowered expectations for poor and minority
students has been institutionalized in the practice of tracking. When
21William Ryan, Blaming the Victim , p. 56.
18
implemented with good intentions, tracking has had questionable benefits,
but in urban schools, tracking has become a powerful weapon against
uncooperative and undesirable students. James Herndon, in The Wav It
Spo-zed To Be, reported the story of Virgil, a student in the eighth
and lowest track:
I went down the next day before class and looked up old
Virgil's 1.0. It happened to be, at last testing, 138.
I was going to ask one of the counselors just what he was
doing in group H, but while I waited for them to show up
I read farther down the card. After a lot of written
comments like "troublemaker" and "adjustment difficulty
to classroom situation" and a couple of referral dates
to Juvenile Hall, I found the letter H, followed by the
words Teacher Recommendation . 2-
Under the guise of individualizing instruction and opportunity, track-
ing, "special education" for problem students, and elitist special
high schools in urban systems have served to perpetrate class lines
and racial exclusion.
Recent studies by Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson have pro-
vided data which demonstrated the effects of teacher expectations on
student achievement— the self-fulfilling prophecy. Despite flawed
research techniques, their study exnosed the cause and effect relation-
ship between expectation and performance and demonstrated the suscepti-
bility of teachers to suggestion.
The researchers subtly gave teachers access to some "planted"
information which identified some of the students as potential
"spurters"—students who would excel later in the year after a slow
^James Herndon, The Way It Spozed To Be (New York: Bantam Books,
1969)
,
p. 32.
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stsrt. In fact, tins spurte,rs were randomly chosen. Rosenthal and
Jacobson found that the "spurters" did in fact make greater gains than
their classmates throughout the school year. Further, in studying
teacher attitudes towards various students, Rosenthal and Jacobson
found that teachers exhibited an unfavorable response to children who
7 aprogressed when they were not expected to.
Usually, new teachers in urban schools do not willfully fall into
preconceived assumptions about their students. Through diaries of new
teachers, Estelle Fuchs studied how optimistic expectations changed to
puzzlement, confusion, and finally resignation to the pervasive belief
r\ /
that poor and minority children cannot learn. 4 Eleanor Leacock, in
Teaching and Learning in City Schools
,
observed the same phenomenon.
New teachers began "with the assumption that all children can learn as
something of a question or a wish." Disillusioned by the many diffi-
culties of teachin'g in an inner city school and confused by the threat
of failure, the teacher "does not turn the responsibility back on him-
self or (at least in any open way) on the school system. It is easier
to place the responsibility where he is told at every turn it lies
—
with the children." In self-defense, the teacher who feels unable to
^Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Teacher Expectations (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).
2
^Estelle Fuchs, Teachers Talk : Views From Inside City Schools
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969).
2
^Eleanor Leacock, Teaching and Learning in City Schools (New York
Basic Books, 1969) , p. 205.
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be effective scolds his children for "not getting it," covers up intel-
lectual confusions with shallow moralisms, and privately, even openly,
describes the problem as one of "motivation."
ElScitior Leacock s studies concluded that the teachers' expectations
of their students correlated highly with the race and social status of
the students. And whether the teachers and students were black or
white was less relevant than the social status of the students and the
teachers' preconceptions of the future roles those students would per-
form in society. Concerning the goals of education, for example, the
teachers of middle-class students spoke of "love of learning" while the
teachers of lower-class students spoke of "acceptable standards of
behavior." The teachers in the middle-income classrooms generally
made higher demands of their students, both academically and behav-
iorally
.
Furthermore, the positive feelings of teachers towards students
were influenced by the relationship between economic status and academic
achievement of the students. In the middle-income schools, the
children whom the teachers felt most positive about had average I.Q.
scores some eleven points higher than those toward whom they felt
negative. In the lower class Negro school, the case was exactly the
opposite. The children the teachers felt positive or neutral toward
had average I.Q. scores almost ten points lower than those about whom
they felt negative. "As can be seen, the teachers' evaluations of
the children parallel the children's status as groups in the eyes of
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society, with Negro lower than white, low- income lower than middle-
income
.
What urban schools are doing to poor and minority students is not
simply imposing middle-class values on them but conveying middle-class
att itudes towards them. The common thread is what William Ryan called
"blaming the victim." Racism and class prejudice are at the core of the
failure of urban education to provide equal educational opportunity for
poor and minority Americans.
The question that haunts that accusation is whether a fair chance
in school will be enough to counteract the larger society’s prophecy of
failure for these children. Schools are only one part of the pattern
of institutionalized white racism. But they are an immensely influential
part—a child spends most of twelve years in a classroom. Providing
hope for poor and minority children in urban schools can only occur
as part of providing hope for them in the larger society. The spiral
of hopelessness has an analogy in a spiral of hopefulness and change.
The myths that are challenged in this and the following chapters
carry out Kenneth Clark's reminder that "disadvantaged" children learn
when they are adequately taught. Urban schools that succeed not only
contradict the myth of failure but also help to create hope that can
feed upon itself in a reversal of the self-fulfilling prophecy of
failure.
26 Eleanor Leacock, pp. 136, 195.
C H A P T E'R II
SUBURBS AND CITIES: SEPARATION AND INTEGRATION
The primary impact of white racism upon urban schools has been
racial separation. That separation has maintained inner city ghettoes
of concentrated populations, poverty and crime, deteriorated and over-
crowded housing. Control of everything from schools, stores, and
garbage collection to petty rackets has stayed in the hands of outsiders,
mostly white, who exploited the ghetto existence.'*'
The fact of racial separation has created a long list of euphemisms
for dealing with racism in schools— including the phrase itself, "urban
education." "Inner city," "ghetto," "slum," "target area," or "dis-
advantaged" schools all mean "black, poor schools." For whites, the
matching euphemisms for their segregated schools have become "neighbor-
hood schools," "protecting property values," "quality education," and
"safety in schools."
1. The Persuasive Role of Leadership and Media
As the decade of the 1970's began, Northern white feelings about
integrated education were ambivalent. In surveying those feelings, a
lot depended on how the question was phrased. Northern whites were
often more positive on intent than on practical means to carry out
integration.
1See Gilbert Osofsky, The Making of a Ghetto (New York: Harper
. Torchbooks, 1966) and Allen Spear, Black Chicago : The Making of a Negro
Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
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Clearly a maj or ity had favored an end to legal segregation in the
South. They deplored stories of violence in Pontiac, Michigan, were
unopposed to decentralization in New York City, and approved efforts
for providing minority children with better educational opportunities.
They were heartened, by individual stories of interracial friendships.
In essence, they favored integration—as long as it was not in their
neighborhood or their children's schools.
Most saw their own individual role as less prejudiced than their
neighbors. They personally liked the idea of at least token integra-
tion in schools. Programs like METCO which bussed some ghetto children
to suburban schools were fine. Voluntary transfer plans that might
*
bring more black children to previously all-white schools were also
acceptable
.
Most also preferred to maintain their neighborhood schools, but
were willing to accept small scale bussing or consolidation of schools
for some purpose besides racial balance. They accepted the idea of
desegregated education in theory but resisted when the real difficul-
ties of doing something became apparent. They agreed that schools
should not be segregated, but were not willing to pay higher taxes or
change their neighborhood schools to do so.
Clearly most (68 percent in one survey) were opposed to bussing
2
for the sole purpose of racial balance.
^Newsweek, March 13, 1972, p. 24.
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It made a great deal of difference how national leaders phrased
the issues of integration—whether they appealed to people's hopes or
fears. Many black parents as well resisted the idea of bussing for the
sole purpose of racial balance, without the prospect of improved educa-
tion. If the President or the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare stated that integrated schools were the only present proven
route to equality of education, that statement put the issue of bussing
in a far different light than if such leaders called for equality but
insisted on the sanctity of neighborhood schools.
The moral and mental confusion which surrounded the issue of
bussing was exemplified by the statements of Presidential candidate
"Scoop" Jackson in the spring of 1972. Senator Jackson, described as
having a good record on civil rights, supported a Constitutional amend-
ment to outlaw bussing and guarantee the integrity of neighborhood
schools. Without the larger framework of understanding institutional-
ized racism and inequality perpetuated by suburban exclusiveness, the
issue of bussing and desegregation of schools could not be approached
with any clarity.
The role that national media played in illuminating or distorting
the issues was as crucial as the role of national leaders. When
television and newspaper accounts focused on violence and disruption
and ignored the many districts where schools integrated peacefully,
they reinforced the fears of both black and white parents. As Charles
Silberman pointed out in Crisis in t he Classroom , American media had
yet to accept an educational role for the public by clarifying the
critical issues and by preparing the public for change before such
changes descended.
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In November, 1971, three national magazines ran articles on
suburban exclusiveness and bitting. The Serrano case in California
was challenging the. whole structure of local financing of schools,
while it was clear from statements from the national leadership that
the issues of integration and bussing were reaching a crisis point. The
three articles formed three foci in a spectrum of clarity and forceful-
ness illuminating the issues of institutionalized racism and class domi-
nance. Their titles clued their places on the spectrum: the most fair,
forceful, and enlightening article, from the New York Times Magazine
was entitled, "The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates;" the more moderate,
but still basically strong article in Newsweek was called, "The Battle
of the Suburbs;" the ambivalent and misleading article from Time maga-
zine was appropriately called "The Agony of Bussing Moves North."
The Time article represented the subtle irresponsibility of
journalism which sought to write about issues of institutionalized racism
with appropriate "liberal enlightenment" while distorting the issues to
feed the basest fears of white middle Americans. In short, the article
focused on the fears and weaknesses of white parents about losing their
hard-won suburban properties and exclusively white schools. It quoted
a typical parent: "I don't see any reason why they've got a right to
come in here and tell me my kids can't use the school I bought and paid
^"The Agony of Bussing Moves North," T ime , November 15, 1971,
p. 57.
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The article told about one Boston suburban family whose opposition
to integration was "not caused by bigotry" but who felt helpless to com-
bat the threats of dangerous schools and streets, crime, and lower
academic achievement. The family selected who said "yes" to integra-
tion was the family. of the Governor of Virginia, who sent his children
to integrated, city schools. It was obvious who most Americans would
identify with—the honestly perplexed little man rather than the power-
ful public servant who could afford a little noblesse oblige. A rather
unconvincing story was then told about a lawyer's family who cried
tears over sending their children to a less affluent school but sent
them anyway because "my husband feels very strongly about integration"
—
another example easy to write off as a masochism or madness. To be
sure, at the end of the article, the reporter presented all the liberal
arguments for integration, but the arguments came too late, after the
damage was done. Few Americans would take the word of scholarly
research or the Supreme Court's legal pronouncements over the words and
experiences of their well-intentioned neighbors.
Clearly, much of the source of educational inequality and racial
segregation in northern cities stemmed from suburban exclusiveness. As
the Newsweek article pointed out: "Now, for the first time in history,
more Americans (a total of 76 million) live in the suburbs than in
either the great urban enclaves (which are home to 59 million) or in
the predominantly rural regions outside the metropolitan areas (total
population: 71 million)." Population shift alone had disastrous
effects on the inner cities. But the picture of a "white noose" of
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suburbia surrounding the central city and stealing its resources became
blatant with the movement of industry to suburbs. The jobs moved, but
the housing remained closed to the workers: "In the New York suburbs,
it is estimated that 150,000 of the 750,000 new jobs created during the
last decade were blue-collar jobs. But the number of blue-collar
workers who found homes in the New York metropolitan area suburbs during
the same period increased by only 50,000.^
The Newsweek article went a long way in illuminating the inequality
created by the suburban residential monopoly. But some of its force was
undercut by labeling those who were challenging that monopoly "open-
housing activists." And, almost as if the earlier framework for
inequality had not been established, the article stated, "there is no
denying that even federally subsidized low-cost housing rarely 'pays
its way' in suburbia."^ Of course low-income housing increased the
tax burden for schools and services, and higher population density
caused more problems. But those facts remained a distortion of the
truth without the other side of the picture. The suburban residents
who wished to preserve their middle-class sanctuaries derived their
economic life blood from the cities.
Responsible journalism should present both a clear understanding
of the causes of inequality and the hope of positive solutions. The
New York Times article was the most helpful of the three by beginning
^"The Battle of the Suburbs," Newsweek, November 15, 1971, p. 62.
^"The Battle of the Suburbs," Newsweek , November 15, 1971, p. 64.
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clearly with the public responsibility for segregation and inequality:
As the population, the taxable income and the jobs have
l^ft the cities for the suburbs, the 'urban crisis' of
substandard housing, declining levels of education and
public services, and dried-up employment opportunities has
been created. The crisis is not urban at all, but national,
and in part a product of the walls that have been built by
the suburbs to discourage outward movement by the poor and
blacks in the cities.
The article, unfortunately, did not elaborate on the shameful
partnership the federal government played in suburban inequality by sub-
sidizing private housing through mortgage guarantees and tax deductions
for interest payments, by higher per pupil educational aid for suburban
districts than for urban districts, and by building highway systems to
suburbs which facilitated inexpensive commuting. Further, federal and
city authorities destroyed housing for the urban poor. While leveling
slums and constructing highways to the suburbs, urban renewal destroyed
more low- income housing than it replaced. As both the Times and
Newsweek articles pointed out, not only were inner city residents pre-
vented from moving to suburbs by restrictive zoning laws, but the jobs
that sustained them moved out to the suburbs, leaving them trapped in
decaying inner cities without jobs or adequate housing.
Suburbs were increasingly willing to admit industry into their
boundaries for tax support but were unwilling to allow the human task
forces for those industries the right to live where they worked. In one
example cited, the Ford Motor Company purchased about 200 acres of land
^Linda Davidoff, Paul Davidoff, Neil Gold, "The Suburbs Have lo
Open Their Gates," The New York Times Magazine , November 7, 1971, p. 40.
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in Mahwah, New Jersey, mid-vay between New York City and Newark, for a
plant which emnloyed 4,200 workers. Only 2 percent of the workers
lived in Mahwah, which was zoned for middle and upper income homes.
The plant workers had to commute from New York or Newark at considerable
expense. The taxes paid by the company only benefited Mahwah residents.
The New York Times article ended, if not on a note of inspiring
hope, at least on a note which predicted the future and prepared its
public for that future:
Non-profit groups and public agencies should also be pre-
paring for the future by negotiating for tracts of suburban
land, on the theory that when the exclusionary laws are
struck down, they had better be ready with plans for con-
struction of low and moderate-cost housing, or they will
risk leaving the whole ball game to the private developers.
^
Breaking the monopoly of the suburbs would undoubtedly be a diffi-
cult transition for some. But the fears that the inner city and all its
blight would move wholesale to the suburbs were absurd. The blight of
the inner city rested primarily on the fact of suburban separatism.
However difficult and "unfair” the transition to eaualitv and an open
society might be, the necessity was clear. Irresponsible journalism,
like the Time magazine article, which muffled the necessity and played
up the fears and difficulties did a disservice to American democracy.
2. Teaneck, New Jersey—Case Study of
"Triumph in a White Suburb"
Bussing was clearly an expedient to combat racial isolation and
educational inequality. It was a temporary expedient. On the one hand,
7Davidoff and Gold, P- 55.
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bussing made little sense. .But more illogical was a society in which
minority populations were systematically ghettoized, oppressed, and pro-
vided inferior education. Once the racial isolation in the schools was
broken, the most important motivation for residential isolation was
also broken. Once the burden for quality schools was shared equally,
the blatant disparities between white and black schools began to dis-
appear. Perhaps more important, by lifting from school children the
illusion that suburbs were a self-contained universe of white middle
class affluence, unconnected with the fate of the cities, those children
would become better prepared to participate in a future society freer
of racism and social inequality.
Whether a predominantly white community reacted to bussing and
integration with resistance and violence as in Pontiac, Michigan, or
with acceptance, even optimism, as in Berkeley, California, depended a
great deal on the ’ community and public leadership. The case study of
Teaneck, New Jersey, described by Reginald G. Damerell in Triumph in <z
g
White Suburb, is a crucial volume in the history of racial prejudice
in America.
Teaneck was the first northern suburb to integrate its schools
voluntarily. As Mr. Damerell pointed out, Teaneck provided almost a
perfect "control community" for studying racial prejudice and public
leadership. The children in Teaneck public schools from the black com-
munity numbered a mere 600 out of 8,200 students seven percent. In
^Reginald G. Damerell, Triumph in a White Suburb (New York:
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1968).
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Teaneck, the prejudice against blacks could not by any stretch of the
imagination have been explained on the basis of lower economic status,
lowered property values or lower achievement in schools: "Teaneck had
no slums. The members of the Negro community were of the same economic
level as the whites. whom they replaced. Moreover, they were of a some-
what higher class with respect to its number of college degrees and
years of education." The school with the highest black enrollment was
fourth in town wide achievement—higher than three all-white elementary
schools. "Had it not been for color
,
the rest of the town would have
realized that this group in the northeast section, if anything, had
9
upgraded Teaneck." The furor and bitterness raised by the integration
of Teaneck' s elementary schools, therefore, clearly stemmed from one
cause— irrational, unexamined prejudice. Teaneck's successful integra-
tion revealed the importance of words, of leadership, and of creating a
dialogue that dealt with the real issues of white racism and the educa-
tion of children.
In 1949, the U. S. Army selected Teaneck as a Model American Town
for post-war publicity in occupied Germany and Japan, praising it for
its "fine municipal spirit and the high quality of its governmental
services." By the 1940's, nearby Englewood had a Negro ghetto reaching
to Teaneck's borders. Recognizing a potential threat to their suburban
image, Teaneck town fathers hurriedly established a park area as a
buffer zone between the edge of Teaneck and Englewood ghetto. By 1945,
9Damerell, Triumph in a White Suburb , pp. 261-262.
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half a dozen black families lived just over the border of Teaneck,
largely ignore by most Teaneck residents.
In 1954, after several black families had brought or built fine
homes beyond the "buffer zone," panic selling hit the northeast section.
Teaneck agents abandoned the area to out-of-town agents who saw an
opportunity for fat profits through block busting. Thev would call or
visit white home owners and tell them to sell now while they could,
spreading the fear of being the "last white on the block." At this
crucial juncture, the long fight for racial equality began, signifi-
cantly, on the issue of segregated housing. A group of concerned,
white residents of the northeast section organized the Civic Conference
to fight the block-busting and to preserve an integrated neighborhood.
The whites on the committee were almost all Jewish, although the
area was predominantly gentile. The early opening up of Teaneck to
a Jewish minority had important future consequences for the integration
of Teaneck. In a sense, the Jews acted as "bigot repellents." As
Mr. Damerell hypothesized:
Anyone anti-semitic enough to move away from Jews is
almost invariably anti-Negro. The two prejudices are
not identical but usually go together in the bigoted
personality. Had there been no Jews to repel these
Christians, they would have remained and fought against
school integration.-^
Teaneck was not without anti-semitism, however. Resistance
towards more schools and increased taxes tied closely with enmity
towards Jews and feelings that schools were hot beds of Communism
10Damerell, pp. 80-81.
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(feelings fanned by McCarthy)
. Progressive education and big spending
were associated with Jews.
In 1958
,
as a result of the sudden death of the mayor, Teaneck
found itself with a Jewish mayor—an astonishing event no one would
have predicted at that time. After the 1960 School Board election,
there were four Jewish members on the nine-man board. The remark was
heard in Teaneck, "The Jews are taking over."
Despite the efforts of the Civic Conference to keep the northeast
integrated, the area became increasingly segregated. The Civic
Conference repeatedly urged the Town Council to establish a Human
Relations advisory board to deal with the problem of increasing segrega-
tion. But the Council gave a characteristic response: "There is no
problem." Most whites in Teaneck in fact, right up to the time of
actually integrating the schools, simply refused to believe that a
so-called ghetto existed in Teaneck. Or, if they believed it existed,
they had never seen it and firmly believed it must be shabby and run
down.
In 1961, the Teaneck School Board made a crucial choice in decid-
ing to hire a strong superintendent who cculd contend with the many
disgruntled factions in Teaneck. They chose Harvey Scribner,
Superintendent of Dedham, Massachusetts schools, a native Mainer.
Shortly following Scribner's arrival, the school budget was defeated for
the first time on a wave of anti-semitism. "Christians transferred
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their enmity against Negroes to Jews because the latter appeared to be
fighting the Negroes’ battles." 11
Black enrollment in the Bryant Elementary School in the northeast
was up to more than thirty percent. Black parents expressed their
concern that Bryant would become stigmatized as a ghetto school and
would decline in prestige. White parents with children in Bryant became
increasingly afraid that the school's record was not good, although it
in fact measured up in every way to other Teaneck schools.
In next door Englewood, racial tension was high over segregated
schools. A lawsuit was in the courts, and people in Teaneck would say,
"We don’t want Englewood's troubles here"—usually meaning ignoring
segregation in the hopes that "it" would go away.
Harvey Scribner thought otherwise. Although new to the problems
of segregation, his background—working class origins and a broken
home, working his way through college, and dealing with bigotry in
New England towns
—
prepared him well for the human relations problems
he would face. Scribner believed the problems of racism and segrega-
tion had to be brought out into the open and dealt with. His Board,
though receptive, was very reluctant to open this Pandora's box.
Nevertheless, Scribner convinced the Board to adopt as a first step an
open transfer policy to ease overcrowding and encourage lessening of
ghettoization. The Board also went on record with a historic policy
statement of prevention: "The Teaneck Board of Education recognizes
^Damerell, p. 150.
35
the future potential for racial imbalance in the William Bryant and
Washington Irving Schools, and the Teaneck Board of Education favors
the initiation of a program prior to the existence of de facto segrega-
tion to prevent racial imbalance in any of the schools. 12 Initial
reaction to the statement and the volunteer transfer plan was
unexpectedly mild.
The plan for voluntary transfer failed to change the picture of
racial imbalance. Black parents were justifiably unwilling to place
the entire burden for integration on their children
—
particularly
when the schools they were in were of high quality. When Scribner met
with black parents in one crucial meeting, they expressed their anger
and impatience with such token measures. Scribner spoke straight to
them and pledged a stronger second step when this one failed. He
revealed in confidence his plan for ending racial imbalance: making
the two schools, Bryant and Irving, central sixth and fifth grade
schools with the lower grades dispersed evenly among other elementary
schools. The key factor, he understood, was timing.
In his first years of office, Scribner won respect from his
Board. He tackled the touchy problem of religion in the schools right
away, convincing the Board to de-emphasize certain practices at
Christmas and to disallow such practices as collecting money in classes
for Christmas trees. He went on to educate the Board by supplying a
steady stream of articles with information on the integration problems
12Damerell, p. 166.
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of other communities. He gave the- Board copies of James Baldwin's
The Fire Next Time.
The Board respected Scribner, but they also felt he was pushing
too hard. They asked his wife, "Can't you get him to slow down?"
But Scribner and his wife had discussed the situation at length and
were prepared to stake his job on preventing segregation at the Bryant
School. He got Board members to attend a private meeting with members
of the Negro community and asked those invited to state what they
would like on the agenda. At the January, 1963, dinner meeting,
black citizens discussed the need for revised textbooks and unbiased
teacher attitudes—especially in guidance counselors. Board members
expressed amazement at how professional and well-educated Teaneck
Blacks were. The lack of insight of the Board was generally not out-
right bigotry but lack of exposure and experience. Some Blacks pointed
out that if Teaneck became segregated, they would move out, and the
next Negroes who would come would be lower class. But other Blacks
strongly disagreed. It was an eye-opener for the Board to see that
they could no longer think in abstract stereotypes and generalize
about all Negro attitudes.
By spring of 1963 the Board said it was "studying several plans
submitted by the Board members .. .who feel that steps should be taken
13
to prevent a recurrence of the Englewood situation." The Board had
one black member, Lamar Jones, who was not clearly for integration and
was suspected of being an "Uncle Tom" in the black community, but who
13Damerell, p. 185.
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was nevertheless the first black Board member in Teaneck. By now
black enrollment at Bryant had reached 46 percent and 20 percent at
Irving. The Board came up with essentially an extension of the same
volunteer transfer plan. Most on the Board congratulated themselves
on a good solution, even though the plan was in fact naive and
probably illegal, since it discriminated against whites, not allowing
them the same transfer privileges. Black parents, of course, equally
resented the second volunteer transfer plan. One said, "I do not
think that my children are inferior. I think that to transfer Negro
children puts a heavy burden on young shoulders
.
In meetings with black parents, Scribner continued to show his
ability to learn about the issues yet be himself. At one point he was
accused by an angry parent of breaking a promise and he replied, "I
will not sit here and permit you to categorize me with all other
whites. You can tell me what my problems are, but don't classifv me
with every other white person who has ever mistreated vou."-^ Scribner's
directness built mutual trust and respect with Blacks and whites urging
integration in Teaneck.
By fall of 1963, public demands that the Board adopt a mandatory
integration plan became more insistent. Many felt Brvant was fast
becoming stigmatized— in a public meeting a white middle-class woman
referred to it as "a colored school." The Board felt pressured into
^Damerell
,
p. 190.
15Damerell, p. 195.
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considering some plans. The August March on Washington and the
Kennedy administration made morale high for integration.
The Board began considering essentially three plans: (1) Con-
verting Bryant to a central sixth-grade school and re-distributing
Bryant grades one to five through the other elementary schools:
(2) A modified Princeton Plan which would pair Bryant with Whittier
and Eugene Field with Washington Irving. Two of the paired schools
would house grades one to three and the other two grades four to six.
Four elementary schools would be left unintegrated: (3) Continue
voluntary enrollment, initiate an outside consultant study, and
meantime freeze enrollment at Bryant and Washington Irving so that
all new pupils would be assigned to other schools.
When Whittier parents learned that their school might be paired
with Bryant, they turned out in droves for a P.T.A. meeting. Although
the difference between Whittier and Brvant in terms of relative
standing in Teaneck was negligible (and all Teaneck schools rated
above national averages)
,
parents got hysterical over the possibility
of equating the schools. The Whittier Principal, a respected educator
in the system, had been quoted to sav, "Can you imagine what they will
do to it when they get here!" But at the public P.T.A. meeting in
December, the tide of the meeting turned. The liberals had also come
out in full force. The integrationists won the first skirmish of the
battle
.
16Damerell, p. 203.
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At this point, a curious thing started to happen. A "new
opposition" emerged on the scene. The leaders had never taken part
in town activities before. All at once, on the issue of integration,
they came out of the woodwork. Chief among them was Dr. Harry Warner,
a New York City surgeon. He and his wife had been known as rather
apathetic about town and school issues. They had lived there ten
years and spoke of Teaneck as a "hick town." Now, their home was the
center of ferment. They began to lead the opposition to integration,
arguing for neighborhood schools, lunch at home, no bussing—the
classic arguments. Ironically, Warner himself was Jewish.
In spring of 1964, the opposition forces moved into action.
Warner had decided to run for the school board. He and his wife took
off strong and clear on an anti-bussing campaign. Their cry was that
they were not against integration, but were against bussing.'*''
7
In
the February election, the budget was again defeated, and Warner and
Margolis, two of the three candidates against bussing, won positions
on the school board. It was clear that the voters were voting for
segregation, whether out of prejudice or ignorance or both.
A month before the election, Scribner had presented the Board
with his plan for a centralized fifth and sixth grade. This alterna-
tive still placed most of the burden for bussing on the Bryant and
Irving parents, but it avoided leaving some schools unintegrated which
the pairing would do. The Board was badly divided on how to proceed
"^Similarly
,
in the March, 1972 Newsweek poll cited earlier, 66
percent of white Americans agreed that schools should be desegregated,
while 69 percent opposed bussing.
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on integration, but Warner and Margolis viewed the other seven members
as a solid conspiracy to foist bussing on Teaneck.
The Board members realized they would have to act now, before
another School Board election might bring in more anti-integration
forces. The town was becoming increasingly polarized. Most kept
their prejudice veiled behind rhetoric for "the will of the majority"
and the integrity of neighborhood schools. Warner and his supporters
held secret cottage meetings and screened those allowed to attend.
One strategy was for Warner to leave early. Then others would con-
duct a discussion in which privileged information of Warner's office
would be revealed. In May of 1964, the Neighborhood School Association
was formed out of the anti-integration forces.
On May 11, the Board met in executive session to adopt an integra-
tion plan to present to the public at the May 13 public Board meeting.
Simultaneously, members of NSA were meeting with the Town Council
members to convince them to tell the School Board not to act because
of impending "violence" and public protest. NSA had a Negro woman
as vice-president who assured the Council that the black community
was against bussing and the plan to make a central sixth grade school.
But the Board had reached agreement. Bryant would become an all sixth
grade school and Bryant children from the first five grades would be
bussed to other elementary schools (excluding Irving) . Enrollment
in Irving would be frozen after re-zoning the district to include 79
more white children. After the vote had been taken, several of the
Town Councilmen rushed in breathlessly in a state of near panic.
41
But more moderate councilmen arrived shortly thereafter. Mayor Feldman
simply said, "Gentlemen, this is your decision to make," and left.
The Warner forces were getting ready for the May 13 public
Board meeting. That morning NSA ran anti-bussing ads saying "Help
Preserve Your Neighborhood Schools." That evening, an almost totally
new audience was at the public Board meeting—faces never seen before
by many Board members—faces mostly hostile. The chairman sensed a
crisis situation and directed Board members to keep to a low tone
and avoid emotionality. When the motion was raised for the sixth
grade school, it was met by boos and catcalls. Warner and Margolis
moved to table the motion and were voted down. When Harvey Scribner
took the microphone, he met with derogatory cracks and clenched fists.
But the chairman was able to keep tempers cooled. After a final
confirming vote of the motion, taken in dead silence, the audience
erupted in screaming and shouting. The Board seriouslv wondered if
they would be attacked. But the audience staved in control and
cries went up for "Recall! Recall!" All this, over centralizing a
sixth grade school with bussing—a move which in other towns caused
no furor at all—no furor when the issue did not involve black children.
Hate literature began to flow into Teaneck, mostly from extrem-
ist organizations in the South, reading "Integration, Denegration,
Mongrelization. " Most of it was anti-semitic as well as anti-Negro.
The messages were too blatant and did not have much influence in
Teaneck. The NSA offended some previously neutral people when they
picketed the National Democratic Convention with pretests against
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what was happening in Teaneck. Even some of their supporters resented
having the town’s dirty linen hung in national view.
When school opened in September, about sixty-four couples had
threatened to boycott the sixth grade school. The Town Council sent
them letters urging them to keep the law and to use their vote to
express their discontent. All the schools opened without incident.
There were no boycotts. But that night at a public Board meeting,
vitriolic verbal attacks were high. Nevertheless, the voting con-
tinued—basically seven to two on all issues. At this point, the
Warner campaign began to take on new rhetoric, the "Communist con-
spiracy" tack. This approach helped members of NSA to attack people
with long and honorable records—Mayor Feldman, Scribner, and other
Board members—as unknowing dupes of the larger conspiracy. Warner's
speeches began to get more extreme. He equated John Dewey and Karl
Marx. Opponents began to call the Warner forces "Know Nothings" and
laugh at their rhetoric. Most parents were satisfied with the new
sixth grade school. But the crucial test to see if integration— it's
first step—could hold would be the school board election of February,
1965.
The pro-integrat ion Teaneck Political Assembly reluctantly decided
they had to run a new slate to oppose Warner, Margolis and their
candidates. The old slate was too closely associated with the May 13
decision for integration. They also believed they could only win by
getting the vote out in record numbers. One group of liberals felt,
like Scribner, that the integration issue had to be met head on—there
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was no way to win by simply, talking about quality education at the
sixth grade central school. Eventually, the Teaneck Political Assembly
became convinced to have their three candidates run openly on the plat-
form that segregated education was inferior education--for all.
From January 4 for the next five weeks, Teaneck was immersed
in local election campaigning. The integration forces ran a top-notch
professional campaign. Canvassers were taught how to identify poten-
tial plus voters and not waste time arguing with negative voters.
Three cottage parties were scheduled each night. Candidate forums
were to be held in the high school with all candidates speaking.
At the first of these forums, the NSA candidates came across
badly. They were so clearly negative, with no positive platform.
When asked questions about the moral and legal aspects of segregation,
they stumbled. At one point, one candidate who was getting embar-
rassed and frustrated blurted out, "You have branded your people as
18
inferior . We have not." The audience was shocked at such blatant
prejudice. The negativism, the evasion, and the extremism of Communist
conspiracy rhetoric began to boomerang on the NSA. But still, the
challenge to win the election was to get the vote out, since many of
the opposition were hidden and could not be engaged or confronted.
Dr. Scribner saw close parallels between Dr. Warner's campaign
and the goals of the John Birch Society. He had faced some of the
same threats and pressures in Dedham. In a last ditch attempt, Warner
18Damerell, p. 309.
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and Margolis obtained illegally a school administration tape of a
conference Scribner had attended. They felt the tapes proved that
Scribner had premeditated to "subvert the will of the majority." They
had the tapes made into plastic records and mailed out en masse the day
before the election. The Scribner forces could have obtained a court
order to stop the mailing of the records, but they saw the records as
essentially harmless—few people would read into them what Warner was
reading into them. Scribner quipped at a public meeting, "I am the
only superintendent who has a record about to come on the market."^
On election day, February 9, 1965, the "Good Guys" won all three
contested seats on the School Board. In each case they won by about
7,000 to 5,000 votes, a record turnout for Teaneck. "The victory, it
is important to remember, was for an integration plan in operation .
Had the sixth-grade plan not been in effect but only proposed for the
coming year, chances are that Kaplan, Sampson and Foah would have won
20
as Warner and Margolis had the year before."
As the case study of Teaneck clearly pointed out, the key to the
narrow victory of the integration advocates rested on positive leader-
ship and on bringing the issues clearly before the public. The emotional
issue of integration aroused an opposition that avoided coming out in the
open and that operated on people’s private fears and prejudices. It
could only be overcome by calm, straight-forward leadership which
appealed to people's common sense and higher motives. "That it should
^Damerell, p. 326.
^°Damerell, p. 336.
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have been so difficult to achieve, where Negroes and whites were so
evenly matched, throws a great deal of light on the difficulties of
communities where actual disparity does exist.
The key to eventually breaking down de facto segregation in schools
is bringing an end .to residential segregation. "But superintendents
of schools and boards of education cannot wait for integrated housing.
They must risk unpopularity by integrating their schools knowing that
most whites, although hostile at first, are soon convinced by the
fait accompli because it is usually in keeping with their consciences."””
President Eisenhower stated that laws cannot change men's hearts. But
the story of Teaneck and the history of civil rights in America prove
otherwise. Laws can change men's actions; and through changed actions,
prejudice and institutionalized racism can abate. Bussing is an incon-
venient means, but clearly a necessary one to end racial separation in
schools
.
3. Berkeley, California—A City Integrates Its Schools
Segregated schools, whether de facto in the North or de jure in
the South, convey to their students a lack of mutual respect and trust
between black and white Americans. By their existence, segregated and
tracked schools are powerful teachers of bigotry, perpetuating racial
ignorance and misunderstandings. Because such segregation has meant
21-Damerell
,
p. 350.
^Damerell, p. 351.
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inequality, integration has become a pragmatic strategy for Blacks to
assure equal and quality education.
Studies of newly-desegregated institutions and communities show
that, in spite of initial
-w antagonisms, only through
integrated situations do racial fears, misunderstandings, and hatreds
23diminish. As the storv of Teaneck, New Jersey, demonstrated, even
without class disparities between races, integration was resisted. In
most areas of the country, however, poverty and racism are institu-
tionally linked. Meaningful integration implies not onlv racism but
class integration.
In American small towns and medium-sized cities, North and
South, the trend is towards at least token desegregation. In response
to protests or legal pressures or through strong leadership, some
districts have ended blatant separation in schools. However, in
huge metropolitan areas—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta— the
2 Atrend is toward increased segregated educational facilities. 4
By the end of the 1960's, the earlier hone that integration would
bring eauality had largelv dwindled. Part of the disillusionment was
pragmatic— schools could not single-handedly counteract major trends
toward ghettoization. Part of the disillusionment was recognition
of the ingenuity of the white maioritv in perpetuating racial
23Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Racially Separate or Together," Journal
of Social Issues
,
Vol. 25, No. 1, 1969, pp . 43-69.
^Raymond W. Mack, Our Children's Burden : Studies of Desegrega -
tion in Nine American Communities (New York: Random House, 1°68)
,
p. 446.
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separation under the guise of integration. Tracking systems often
kept black and minority students isolated within newly integrated
schools. Black parents and children usually found the inconvenience
and burden of bussing placed on their shoulders while white children
remained comfortably ensconced in tbeir middle class neighborhood
schools
.
Aware of the shallow altruism that integration often stood for,
many black and minority spokesmen turned from activism for integra-
tion to activism for Black Power and community control. The often
voiced feeling was, "Leave us alone; just let us run our own
schools." Nevertheless, for small cities such as Springfield,
Massachusetts; White Plains, New York; or Louisville, Kentucky such
political cynicism or social despair was premature. Meaningful inte-
gration was still a foreseeable solution to uneaual educational opdot-
tunities in many parts of America.
In September, 1968, a auiet revolution in school integration
took place in Berkelev, California. Berkeley was the first city of
its size (population 120,000) with a significant black school enroll-
ment, about forty percent, to achieve integration in all its elementary
classrooms. Across the bav from San Francisco, Berkelev had a substan-
tial university community, black and minority community, and hosted
groups as diverse as the Black Panthers and the John Birch Society.
In recent decades, Berkeley's residential patterns divided
predictably into de facto segregation. Whites occupied newer, more
expensive houses on the "hill" and Blacks lived in older, more crowded
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houses on the "flats." The- other pieces of the familiar pattern fell
into place. Housing discrimination resulted in de facto segregation
in neighborhood schools and increasing disparities in facilities,
reputation, and educational achievement between hill and flats schools.
In 1964, Neil Sullivan came to Berkeley as Superintendent from
the Freedom Schools in Prince Edward Countv, Virginia. After his
experience in Civil Rights, he felt uncomfortable about returning to
administration in an affluent Long Island suburb. He saw in Berkeley
an opportunity to carry on the fight for equalitv of opportunitv and
quality education through total integration of school-aged children. 25
Three years earlier Berkeley had elected a majority of liberal
members to its School Board, including its first black member. The
Berkeley High School was physically integrated by virtue of being the
only high school. However, tracking based on traditional achievement
tests succeeded in keeping the high school internallv segregated to a
large extent. In 1964, the Board moved to desegregate the two dis-
trict junior high schools by designating them twelve and thirteen
year-old central schools and by building a new all -ninth grade school,
West Campus.
The situation was rough during Sullivan's first year. The stu-
dents themselves were tense and uncomfortable. In a bitter dispute,
the Parents' Association and The Berkeley Gazette tried to impeach the
25For an autobiographical account of the integration of Berkeley
under Neil Sullivan's leadership, see: Neil V. Sullivan and Evelyn S.
Stewart
,
Now Is The Time : I ntegration In The Berkeley Schools
(Rloomington
,
Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1969).
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Board. But the impeachment- failed to get public support and the
atmosphere in the schools improved. While the majority of the white
population felt satisfied with the speed and extent to which schools
had integrated, increasing complaints from Blacks convinced Sullivan
and the Board, in the Fall of 1966, that the time had come to chal-
lenge segregation in elementary schools.
Sullivan believed that integration had to be achieved at once
because, first, it was the law of the land and, second, it was
moraHy right. He had faith that the most difficult hurdles had been
crossed the high school and junior high schools were phvsically
integrated. Students there were growing in racial respect and
understanding. He knew from his experience that young children in
the earlier grades make no color distinctions. Ironically, it was
this age group and the issue of bussing that aroused the greatest
opposition. Parents echoed typical national cries of the integrity
of neighborhood schools and the costs and dangers of bussing.
In February, 1966, the Board began its campaign on a small
scale with federal support by bussing 238 black children from the
overcrowded "flats" schools to the so-called better "hill" schools.
Extensive parent meetings both in white and black communities pre-
ceded the bussing and prepared for its initiation. Sullivan realized
the pain and burden small-scale bussing put on the black parents and
children. He also feared the hypocrisy of such a token plan. Neverthe-
less, he and the Board hoped that pilot success would allay public
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fears and that the staff would gain necessary experience for system-
wide bussing.
The pilot bussing succeeded, but 1966 brought escalation in
racial tension. In September, after the outbreak of violence across
the bay in Hunter's Point, San Francisco, unrest and fighting took
place in Berkeley High School and the West Campus. Black students
focused their anger on tracking and racism. Sullivan and the Board
pledged to end tracking in Berkeley Schools by 1970. But the con-
troversial subject of tracking could have jeopardized the desegrega-
tion campaign for the elementary schools. Sullivan and the Board
were caught between the urgency of the need for change and the
danger of moving too fast on too many fronts.
By the April 18, 1967 Board meeting, the public pressure of
those who attended, the support of teacher organizations, and the
need for immediate integration all produced a clear mandate. The
Board adopted the resolution to integrate Berkeley's elementary schools
by September, 1968. This resolution was followed by vigorous discus-
sion at dozens of meetings, heated opposition and support, and the
consideration of fifty different plans. What emerged was a simple
plan for bussing. Rather than expediently increasing percentages of
black children in a few schools—a compromise which had repeatedly
failed in other cities--the Board pledged to enroll the same racial
proportions in every school.
Two years later, Berkeley schools were integrated. The corner-
stone of the plan, its basis for legitimacy, was heterogeneous
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classrooms. Although some curricular subjects had "performance"
groups, children were not tracked by achievement or 1.0. tests. The
bright kids were not hindered by the grouping. According to a
recently published study, SAT scores showed "that white, black and
Asian students made better progress before desegregation." The benefits
of integrated classes to all children were tremendous. As one white
teacher put it: I think if we'd done this ten or fifteen years ago,
many of our racial problems would be solved now. The children are so
accepting of each other, with no racism that I can see." 2 ^
Fears that whites would flee to the suburbs were unfounded.
Teacher turnover did not increase. Bussing cost less than one percent
of the total school budget. There were no significant discipline
problems with racial overtones in the elementary schools. And integra-
tion changed some attitudes. Before bussing started, 52 percent of
the white community opposed the idea, and after two years onlv about
27
30 percent were still opposed. Most important, a growing consensus
of people, both black and white, had lost some fears and prejudices
through interaction and were ready to support school integration.
Neil Sullivan's leadership swung the balance towards integration.
He believed in it and projected a personal conviction that gained
respect from black and white parents. He had confidence that people's
26Report by the Center for Urban Education, New York, reviewed
in Saturday Review
,
June 19, 1971, p. 52.
Gertrude Samuels, "How School Bussing Works in One Town," New
York Times, September 27, 1970, p. 52.
27
'Samuels, p. 60.
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attitudes could change, and. he facilitated those changes through
hundreds of public meetings. He fought for system-wide bussing,
heterogeneous classes, and the end of tracking when he could have
settled for token integration and stop-gap measures. Above all, he
had faith that young children are free of racial prejudice and that
parents can learn from their children. His and Berkeley’s success
revealed the hypocrisy of white America's protest, "Not here; not
now! "
The key to successful integration in both Berkeley, California,
and Teaneck, New Jersey, was the strong leadership of black and
white parents, the willingness of the school boards to deal directly
with the issues, and the roles of superintendents Sullivan and
Scribner. In both situations, the issues were laid directly before
the public and discussed in hundreds of public meetings. Through
that process, tokfen desegregation plans were eventually replaced
with plans that placed the burden of integration on the entire com-
munity. Once the initial furor was faced openly and forcefully, par-
ents became convinced that integration could work without sacrificing
quality education.
The stories of Teaneck and Berkeley were being repeated through-
out the country. Under federal court order, Pasadena, California
schools became integrated as of Fall, 1970. It too seems to be work-
ing with minimal opposition and problems. A recent television docu-
mentary on Pontiac, Michigan, showed how tensions have eased and most
significantly—how easily the children have accepted the fait accompli
of integrated schools and classrooms.
53
Predominantly white suburbs have made some small strides towards
increased racial awareness by bussing across district and city lines.
In the METCO Program in Boston, similar to Project Concern in Hartford,
students from Roxbury and other ghettos travel each day to white
suburban high schoo.ls. Similarly, black children from New Haven,
Connecticut, are bussed to suburban North Haven. Only a small pro-
portion of students is involved, and the commuting burden borne by
black students is great. Nevertheless, such programs represent one
tiny step toward racial awareness in suburban areas. At the very
least, these examples demonstrate that despite immediate limitations
upon meaningful integration, no district has to teach discrimination
by its actions. Through exchange programs, by including minority
culture and history in the curriculum, and by recruiting minority
personnel, even the most isolated white schools can demonstrate aware-
ness of the reality of serving a multi-racial society.
The present political rhetoric against bussing for integration
is disheartening. President Nixon has pledged: "We cannot and will
not leave the situation as it is." Calling for a period of "benign
neglect" in racial issues and turning back the clock for integration
denies the American public credit for the significant gains that
have been made. As Thomas Pettigrew's studies predicted, after
initial negative reactions to integration, prejudice and misunderstand-
ing ebbed as personal interaction increased. The American people
have grown in their understanding of the legal and moral mandates
for integration. The tragedy is that the American leadership appar-
ently has not.
CHAPTER III
WHERE CHILDREN LEARN: SUCCESS WITHIN THE SYSTEM
Experimental urban schools have risen into the limelight and
faded quietly or closed with loud protests. Dedicated people have
entered the fray, scored extraordinary successes and retreated in
exhaustion or moved to higher level jobs. A sixth grade teacher in
Chicago after four years of hard planning raised the average achieve-
ment levels of her students above national norms, only to have a new
principal reprimand her, "As long as you teach, you remember your
children are Negroes first and students second." The First Street
School in Manhattan changed the lives of a small group of children,
but the founders realized in all honesty that they could not repeat
that energetic output for a third year without major funding.^
Perhaps it matters little that some experiments are so short-
lived or that the innovators come and go. The important fact is
that quality education can and does happen. The significance of
the single success far outweighs the history of multiple failures.
The self-fulfilling prophecy which has doomed urban schools to
repeated failure can be reversed so that success may feed upon itself.
^Raymond W. Mack, Our Children 1 s Burden : Studies of Desegrega-
tion in Nine American Communities (New York: Random House, 1968),
p. 382. For information on First Street School, see George Dennison,
Lives of Children: A Practical Description of Freedom in its Rela -
tion to~Growth and Learning : The Story of the First Street School
(New York: Random House, 1969).
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A school which proves it can be done provides the essential ingredient
of the American dream—the hope factor.
Quality education is a fact in some urban schools. Integrated
classrooms, unbiased teachers, positive leadership, and community
support can halt at. once the tragic turn-off of talent in inner
city elementary schools. In high schools, where the purposes and
means of education are far less clear, where students are older and
the interaction with a larger society presents difficult pressures
and unanswered questions, a statement of needs and new directions is
more complex. Still, there are promising solutions which offer models
for the future.
Proved successes raise a new question: not can it be done, but
how is it done? There is no simple answer to how change comes about.
The schools, programs, and projects described in this dissertation
have all made small but significant changes in urban education. The
examples cover all ages
—
preschool, elementary, secondary, adult
—
and many different strategies
—
public and private, self-contained and
system wide, structural, physical, spiritual, or political. Some
changes have been short lived. Some model schools and programs are
firmly entrenched; others fight for daily existence. Some seem to
rest entirely on the talents of one leader; others reflect a community
of shared responsibility and concern.
The people who created these institutions had in common the
determination to provide equal educational opportunity for poor and
minority American children. By unshakable optimism, tolerance for
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uncertainty, affection for fellow beings, educational vision and
creativity, political guile and guts, they succeeded. For each
example mentioned, dozens of others could be cited. For prospective
teachers these representative stories provide the often neglected
vision of exciting opportunities to teach, to grow, and to bring
about change in urban schools.
Some of the most dramatic success stories in urban education
concern schools within the system with ordinary resources and a
regular staff. In the elementary schools of American cities, where
most of the damage turning off and dropping out poor and minority
children is done, but where the incredible resiliency of children
never quite gets crushed, the way to reform seems crystal clear. As
Kenneth Clark has maintained, and as the preliminary research on
Sesame Street revealed, so-called disadvantaged children will learn
when they are taught. A variety of methods and texts are available
that teach reading, writing, and numbers without destroying the fun
of learning— if teachers care and believe their children can succeed.
Young children quickly respond to adults who care. They easily
adapt to integrated classrooms of heterogeneous grouping. They are
eager and ready to learn from teachers who are willing to teach.
What is essential is the positive attitude exemplified by Matthew
Schwartz, Principal of P.S. 146 in East Harlem: "I don't want to
hear any talk about apathetic parents or hungry children or sleepy
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children or anything else. We have enough riches to overcome such
handicaps, and we are accountable if these children fail." 2
1. The Right to Read
%
j v Vr-> * >
Probably every urban school system contains at least one
elementary school where poor and minority children are contradicting
the myth of disadvantaged children by achieving above national achieve-
ment norms. Charles Silberman’s Crisis in the Classroom documented
three elementary schools in New York City’s Harlem which were clearly
succeeding at the business of educating children. The principals
and staff of those schools operated within the same contraints as
most inner city schools in New York. Although one was a MES (More
Effective Schools) school with some additional resources, money alone
could not account for the unusual level of success. The positive
leadership of the principals, an atmosphere of warmth and support,
and teachers who were inspired to seek and achieve success made the
difference
.
A recent study of reading programs in four inner city elementary
schools provides a valuable documentation of success. George Weber,
Associate Director of the Council for Basic Education in
Washington, D. C., conducted a study in 1970-1971 based on three
facts
:
Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random
House, 1970), pp . 105-106.
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1. Reading achievement in inner city schools is both rela-
tively and absolutely low.
2. Laymen and school people believe that such low results
are all you can expect
.
3. Ther are
It was, of course, the third fact which motivated Weber to
study successful reading programs and summarize his conclusions in:
"Inner-City Children Can Be Taught To Read: Four Successful
3
Schools." He set as his criteria finding inner-city schools (non-
selective public schools in the central part of a large city which
were attended by very poor children) where children were achieving
in reading substantially above national norms and where the percentage
of gross reading failures was low. After an extensive search, he
found four schools in three different cities: P.S. 11 and John H.
Finley (P.S. 129) in Manhattan; the Woodland School in Kansas City,
Missouri; and the Ann Street School in Los Angeles, California.
The third grade level was chosen to study in depth. Third grade
is the point at which beginning reading instruction normally ends and
at which the achievement gap between poor, minority children and
white middle-class children begins to appear. A reading achievement
test was specially created for the study which correlated with
national achievement tests. The test used focused on children's
"mechanical" ability to read simple American English—unfamiliar
words were eliminated and non-English speaking children were not
^George Weber, "Inner-City Children Can Be Taught To Read:
Four Successful Schools." Washington, D. C. Council for Basic
Education, Occasional Papers Number Eighteen, 1971.
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tested. In each school studied, reading achievement levels were
approximately those of typical average-income schools; 42 to 46 per-
cent of the third graders scored fourth grade or higher on a national
norm basis.
P.S. 11 in Manhattan is a MES school— it has a lower pupil-
teacher ratio of 22:1, has supplementary "cluster teachers," and has
more supervisory and auxiliary personnel, plus a pre-kindergarten.
If being an MES school were the key, however, all MES schools would
be doing better—and most are not. One half of the students are
Puerto Rican, 17 percent are Black, almost all are very poor. The
Principal, Mr. Goldberg, "runs a tight ship." There is no single
reading program—teachers have a wide range to choose from. Classes
are heterogeneous—there is a conscious effort to mix children from
Spanish-speaking homes with others. Every classroom has a library,
and children can take books home for a week at a time. "High
expectations and concern for every pupil are reflected in many
things, including the atmosphere of individualization. Most of all,
there is an obvious emphasis on early reading achievement and the
4
importance given to phonics instruction."
The John H. Finley School in Manhattan (P.S. 129—one of the
three schools described in Silberman's book) is affiliated with City
College as a demonstration school. Seventy percent of the students
are black; thirty percent are from Spanish-speaking homes; all
^Weber, p. 15.
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qualify for free lunch. The Principal, Mrs. Froelich, is "a
no-nonsense leader who is also friendly and kind” and always seems
accessible to teachers and parents. Finley has had a uniform, highly
structured reading program since 1962:
!• All children start out heterogeneous in the first half
of first grade.
2. Individualization (grouping) begins in the second half
of first grade.
3. Careful and frequent evaluation is done by someone out-
side the classroom.
4. A very large variety and quantity of materials are
used
.
5. Phonics—implicity and explicity—is taught in the
first two grades.
"This planned, precise reading program benefits from a general school
atmosphere that includes high expectations, a concern for every child,
and considerable home involvement through homework and school-home
communications
.
Woodland School in Kansas City, Missouri, is an old school,
built in 1921, in which 99 percent of the children are black and
almost all are very poor. The school is part of "Project Uplift,"
a program designed by Robert Wheeler, a black area-superintendent
for the Division of Urban Education. Mr. Wheeler's words challenged
the myth of failure:
-*Weber, pp . 16-18.
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We began with the fundamental belief that inner-city
pupils can learn as well as other pupils, provided the
priorities are sensible, the effort intense, and the
instructional approaches rational in terms of the needs
of the learners. We have not accepted the myth that
environmental factors develop unalterable learning
depression. We believe that so-called negative environ-
mental factors can be overcome with sensitive and respon-
sive teaching.
"Project Uplift" began in Fall, 1968. Reading and speech specialists
were provided for each of the eleven schools involved, plus teacher
aides. The Sullivan Programmed Reading Series was adopted so that
children could proceed at their own pace. In-service training
programs focused on raising staff expectations about pupil potential.
The most important factors for success in beginning reading at
Woodland: high expectations, the use of the Mc-Graw Hill Sullivan
Program, the considerable time devoted to reading, with the reading
and speech specialists plus the teacher aides rounding out the pic-
ture
.
At the Ann Street School in Los Angeles, all the children
—
62 percent Mexican-Amer ican and 38 percent Black—live in a nearby
housing project. The Principal of four years, Mrs. Zikas, first
established order and level of discipline and then turned to
revitalizing the curriculum. The elementary program is ungraded—
a
child may take three or four years to complete it. One half of the
children come to school from 9:00 to 2:00; the other half come from
10:00 to 3:00. In the two hours when only half the class are
^Weber, p. 19.
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present, intensive reading
-instruction takes place. Parent con-
ferences have replaced report cards. The Mc-Graw Hill Sullivan
reading approach is used. There is a very active student govern-
ment, and the school tests the children frequently.
Weber summarized what he saw as success factors common to
sll four schools (and usually not present in unsuccessful inner-city
schools) :
strong leadership (in three cases, a principal; in one
case the area superintendent)
— high expectations
— good atmosphere
— strong emphasis on reading
— additional reading personnel
— use of phonics
— individualization
— careful evaluation of pupil progress.
He also noted what factors did not seem to be essential:
— small class size
— achievement grouping
— quality of teaching staff
— ethnic background of principals and teachers
— preschool education
— physical facilities.
In a sense, his conclusions correspond with those of James Coleman,
with one crucial difference—the schools he studied did not have to
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be integrated (racially or economically) for success to take place.
Change did not come overnight. Each program had been established
for three to nine years. The success of the four schools studied
shows "that the failure in beginning reading typical of inner-city
school is the fault not of the children or their background—but of
the schools.
2. District 12 in the Bronx—Blueprint for Change
The stories of individual elementary schools that have succeeded
are in themselves proof that urban education can be turned around.
Even more convincing is recent evidence that an entire inner city
district has succeeded in upgrading achievement dramatically in its
elementary and intermediate schools. The district that has proven
that success can happen is District 12 in the Bronx; and the primary
force behind that success is Edythe Gaines, Superintendent from 1967
to 1970. Dr. Gaines is a dynamic, intelligent black woman who has
"a reputation for getting things done." In an interview with
Reginald Damerell, as research for a book he is writing on Chancellor
Scribner, Dr. Gaines described her role in bringing about change in
O
District 12.
District 12 is the second poorest district in the Bronx. With
over 42,000 students, it has the most overcrowded schools in the city.
^Weber
,
pp . 25-30.
®The quotations and material for this section were taken from
tapes of Mr. Damerell' s interview with Dr. Gaines. The author of this
dissertation is indebted to Mr. Damerell for making those tapes avail-
able for this research.
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When Dr. Gaines arrived, 15,000 children were not receiving a full
school day of instruction. Most of the children are very poor—most
are minorities, and over 50 percent are Puerto Rican. The community
in 1967 was in a rapid state of transition and very hard to organize
One black neighborhood had been there for many years; but other
areas were rapidly changing. In old Jewish neighborhoods, as people
died or moved to the suburbs, young families with many children came
largely Puerto Rican who were seeking better schools and upward
mobility. Those aspirations provided the organizing force for
Dr. Gaines’ leadership.
She began to win her reputation for getting things done by
finding space—the mobile units provided by the school system were
depressing and inadequate. She created classrooms in unlikely
places—a rooming house, an abandoned factory. A mattress factory
was carpeted and transformed into a school with open classrooms.
Reading was what people were concerned about, so that was what
she chose to focus on. "But it almost didn’t matter what we chose.
Out aims were made clear from the beginning:
— to change the nature of elementary school education
— to change the roles of teachers
— to change the atmosphere in the schools
— to change what we mean by schools
and in the final end, to destroy the egg-crate classrooms."
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When Edythe Gaines arrived in District 12, the schools that had
been basically strong were weakened by the sheer numbers of new
children. District 12 had existed for only two years, thrown
together from other districts, and she was its fourth Superintendent
in two years. She -set out immediately to bring change through
achieving success in elementary reading.
The teachers were involved from the start. "There is no one
who welcomes change. If I want you to change, I must convince you
that what you want to get done I can help you get done better."
Dr
. Gainers was convinced no one was more dismayed at their failures
than the teachers. Secondly, she recognized their limitations. She
believes that to assume simply because someone speaks the language
well and has a B.A. they are an expert linguist and can teach reading
makes no sense. "I say to the teachers, I will put at your disposal
someone who has learned to teach the language and who will put it in
a way that cannot fail, and then you can perform like a genius."
She introduced into all the schools linguistic methods to teach
reading. Language is broken into component parts that a child can
grasp and build upon. A child can learn piece by piece and can trust
his intelligence. ITA (Initial Teaching Alphabet) uses an expanded
alphabet in which each letter has only one sound. After the child
learns reading with ITA and feels confident he can master the skill,
the transition is made to standard—more inconsistent—English. The
Sullivan "Project Read" and Programmed Instruction introduce the
standard alphabet, but introduces only the logical, consistent sounds
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first. A child learns "fat" before he is faced with the silent
e in fate. The method developed by Caleb Gattegno uses words
that are color coded and a lively participatory process for approach-
ing beginning reading.
Each program adopted was simple enough for the average teacher
to use. It was finally possible to really individualize reading
instruction—"the systems we introduced made it impossible for it
not to happen." Teachers found they could manage more easily than
before and now were getting success.
When Edythe Gaines arrived in the district, 86 percent of the
children were reading far below grade level. In her first year,
the Teachers’ Strike disrupted the implementation of the new reading
programs. By 1970, after essentially only two years, District 12
had made a dramatic rise in achievement: over 50 percent of the
children--K through 9—were reading "very close to the national norm.
That increase is even more dramatic when viewed in the context of
other New York inner city schools where reading achievement continues
to go down.
The hard data on achievement in schools is difficult to unearth.
The New York Office of Research and Statistics could not provide
statistics from year to year derived from the same data base. In
fact, the only way Edythe Gaines discovered some data that supported
her perceptions of what was happening in District 12 was when she
investigated why District 12 had a seemingly low budget for special
needs" since it was second poorest in the Bronx. She discovered
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that state and city aid formulas were based on reading achievement—
and District 12 was doing so well that it was being allotted less
aid
.
When she was Superintendent, Dr. Gaines' staff undertook some
studies with the scant resources at their disposal. "Those studies
were good enough to show us clearly two things:"
(1) Schools can make a difference, certainly for poor
children And I don t care what the Coleman Report says."
(2) Secondly, that difference can be made at any grade level.
The myths that disadvantaged children were inalterably hindered in
and segregated schools, and that early childhood education was
the only hope for overcoming that disadvantage did not hold up in
District 12.
Dr. Gaines outlined some of the key strategies for change in
District 12:
(1) Establish a non-threatening situation— "and I think you
can do it." There is no need to fire the principals to get change.
"What you have is totally better than what you think it is."
(2) You have to enhance averageness. Teachers are too busy
to develop curriculum even if they have the skills to do so. You
ask them to share in the process so you can use their insights. A
coordinator helps the teacher and paraprof essionals provide support.
The program must have limited complexity and be easy to communicate.
(3) No long pre-training program was necessary. Such programs
usually are in a vacuum. Begin the program in the teacher's classroom
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with a person there who understands and accepts the program. That's
where the training takes place.
(4) Don t take new ideas and accept them wholesale. Dr. Gaines
adapted programs to the teachers' and students’ needs. It did not
matter which linguistic approach was used—ITA was used in classes
without kindergarten preparation; Miami Linguistics was used in
schools with large Spanish populations; Sullivan "Project Read" was
used in most schools; and Sullivan McGraw-Hill and Gattegno were used
in some schools. They all worked. And where the principal really
bought it, it worked even better.
Dr. Gaines is now working for the Board as Director of the
Learning Cooperative. She spoke of the frustration that increases
the higher up you work in the system. But she reiterated her positive
belief that "all kinds of bits fall into place when you keep your
eyes on the goal of improving education for children."
3. Beyond the Basic Skills—the Challenge
of Accumulated Failure
When teachers and principals do not care, and children are
caught in the self-fulfilling prophecy of failure, the problems of
accumulated failures and despair are passed on to the intermediate
and high schools. Then a student faces the threat of failures in
school and the fear of not making it, by standards of the streets and
of the world behind the television screen. Students may protest
through delinquency, drug addiction, and vandalism. Whether a youth
fights back or rides with the system, his needs for basic survival--
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for money to dress well, date, have a car, and maintain status—are
very real.
Any awareness of the needs and lives of teenagers exposes the
hypocrisy of the standard myth that education is preparation for
life. At the earliest of elementary levels, separation of education
and life is a false dichotomy. Poor and minority youths learn
rapidly what a fraud that "life" will be, how few of their aspira-
tions and talents will be utilized. High schools, especially in
urban areas, are facing the fact that they must figuratively and
literally tear down their walls. Without a convincing connection
between an individual’s experience outside the classroom and his
daily school work, the hope factor in a youth's education disinte-
grates .
Secondary educational reform in the 1950 's was initiated by
the universities seeking better prepared students. Advanced place-
ment preparation and an upgrading of science, mathematics, and lan-
guage brought college level curricula into the high schools. That
curricular reform succeeded in the academic high schools because the
validity of universities and colleges as certifiers, even as a
"preparation for life," went unquestioned. That assumption no longer
stands unchallenged, and the reform of intermediate and high schools
will now have to come from a more legitimate base in order to succeed.
Some of that impetus for reform is coming from the students
themselves and from their parents. Some is coming from a new genera-
tion of teachers and administrators in urban schools.
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Luther Seabrook is a black intermediate school principal in New
York City. His strength, style and programs for change are shaking
up more than just his school, I.S. 44, and the surrounding community
of the Upper West Side. In his previous position as Principal of the
Highland Park Free ^School in Roxbury, Massachusetts, he described
his goal in these words: ...to demonstrate to black parents that
hlsck children can have a successful educational experience in a
Black-controlled, non-destructive educational institution.” 9
Now, operating in what he recognizes as one of "the genocidal
institutions called public schools," Seabrook plans to change some
of the paradoxical discriminations allowed in "public" schools. In
New York, open enrollment, like integration, had become a farce;
"special" high schools meant public prep schools for the advantaged
and lucky; and time and again, the bureaucracy raised fresh barriers
to innovation.
When Seabrook arrived as Principal late in the spring of 1970,
the school was in "bad shape." Serving a student population that
was 41 percent Spanish-speaking (largely Puerto Rican)
,
29 percent
white, and 30 percent black, I.S. 44 had rigidly tracked classes, with
predictable internal segregation. Of the 340 students scheduled to
graduate, 160 were not going to receive the accredited diplomas
necessary for academic high schools. Seabrook immediately instituted
^Luther W. Seabrook, "A New Experiment in Black Education,"
Social Policy
,
May/June, 1970, p. 61.
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a crash tutoring program: in two and a half months, counselors,
teachers, and parent tutors worked to cut that number to 28
.
Seabrook chose a few immediate goals and set out to accomplish
thee.* ..tc. .fwi* ng
,
to raise reading scores of minority children,
and to get parents involved in their children's learning and the
school s curriculum. Above all, he sought to convince teachers that
bheir children could learn and qualify for the elitist special
high schools of New York City.
To upgrade reading he brought in Dr. Gattegno to demonstrate
and implement a new reading approach. The program works because
its philosophy is that minority children can learn. Reading tests
are administered every two months for all children. As a result,
teachers become more aware of the importance of the task and become
more accountable for how their children perform. The frequent tests
also prove to parents and children that tests cannot hurt.
The school originally had four tracks. Seabrook cut these to
two, working patiently with teachers to gradually move toward
heterogeneity at a rate they could tolerate. Tracking in the sixth
and seventh grade was dropped by the fall of 1971. In the new
program for I.S. 44 that Seabrook is implementing, the sixth grade
will focus on two goals: getting kids up to grade level in reading
and giving them a chance to explore and orient to the school. The
sixth grade now has two open classrooms, heterogeneously grouped.
In the seventh grade, the entire curriculum will focus on the
humanities, straight academic courses, "giving them a year of real
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education, perhaps the only one they’ll get.” In eighth grade, the
children are "programmed" by interest and talent and according to
what high school they wish to attend. All eighth grade children take
the competitive special high school entrance tests; all aim to get in.
Parents from the community have been involved in every new
program from tutoring for the special high school entrance exams to
operating a breakfast program to formulating new pro-jects. One
current proposal now being worked out calls for an Institute for
Parents of Disadvantaged Children in which parents can assist in the
planning for a better school and will be paid $10.00 for each meeting
they attend—enough to break even on expenses. The early successes
in Seabrook s school show already. Parents, even administrators
in Harlem schools, are urging children to transfer to I.S. 44.
Seabrook has adopted a risk-taking strategy which is reflected
in his willingness to speak his beliefs in front of anyone—teachers,
students, parents, bureaucrats, or visitors. His office bustles
with human activity and concern—kids with gripes, jokes, and problems:
parents who trust him; teachers who believe in the hope for change
and are grappling with the adjustments for change. Admittedly, his
style brings him criticism from all sides—black leaders and white
liberals as well. Crucially, he tolerates the pressure and ambigui-
ties and communicates a clear understanding of what is.
Luther Seabrook's new school has barelv begun, but all signs
point toward a dramatic demonstration of what integrated schools in
an inner city could look like. His leadership, his guts, and positive
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style
-realistic and hopeful—demonstrate the potential for change
in urban schools, and for racial and ethnic cooperation in a bigoted
city. Seabrook operates with determination and grim humor—what does
he (or the kids' ’ ^'v^lose?
4. Schools Without Walls
The purposes and goals of high school education are not easily
described, especially for inner city schools. If the primary goal
of urban elementary schools is at least definable as preparation for
high school, the problems of high school education lie in profound
ignorance about what skills, experience, and wisdom are necessary
"preparation for life." Discussions about appropriate curriculum,
conflicts between Blacks and whites, drug use and abuse, truancy and
drop outs, vandalism and violence, student rights and faculty rules
for proper conduct are but the more obvious manifestations of a
fundamental problem.
Unbelievably, high schools have acted as though education can
take place only if classrooms can be protected from outside problems.
But police do enter the schools. Doctors and nurses, human relations
specialists, welfare workers, and federal program coordinators are
frequently called in. Politicians and community leaders speak at
commencements. None of these specialists, however, is seen as central
to the school or as instructional staff. Yet the attempt to insulate
students from real life has not quieted student dissatisfaction.
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Paul Goodman has emphasized the gap between the so-called pur-
poses and preparation in high school education and the economic and
social realities that await most high school graduates: "The point-
lessness of the years of schooling is a chief cause of youth dissent
and truancy, at increasingly earlier ages. Naturally, having known
no other dispensation, the students do not know what to ask for." 10
A suburban youth may resist the endless education certification demands
that take him from college board exams through graduate work in prepa-
ration for roles he vaguely understands or accepts. A minority urban
youth may rebel against the sham of his high school education as a
"preparation for life."
There are no easy answers to the problem of reform in the high
schools. Some would close them down; others would tighten "security."
Most educational reformers are anxious to explore alternatives and, at
least, to free students to make choices about their own futures.
In Portland, Oregon, the John Adams High School has undertaken
large-scale reform without a volunteer or specially selected student
population. Adams is a district high school, representing a broad
spectrum; most of the students are from working-class and lower-middle
class families; about one quarter of its 1,280 students are black.
Both a comprehensive high school and a training laboratory in teacher
education affiliated with Oregon State University and Northwest
10Paul Goodman, "Statement," in U. S. Congress House Committee on
Education and Labor, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Needs of Elementary
and Secondarv Education for the Seventies (1970), p. 954.
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Regional Laboratory, its support troops are numerous. The structural
reforms at John Adams are not radical, but they are comprehensive.
Students have considerable voice in the curriculum they encounter.
Half their daily work is unscheduled. They can opt for grades or for
credit/no credit.
The principal of John Adams, Robert B. Schwartz, writes, "If
we are going to break past the siege mentality, we need some new
working models of what an urban high school can be." Piecemeal
tinkering with schedules or the English curriculum or the student
council is not "an adequate response to the problems plaguing high
schools today."
11
The commitment to students’ freedom to control
their own lives— in curriculum, social relationships, or career
plans—cannot be made step by step. Unstructured independent study
and policing of corridors are contradictions that students clearly
perceive
.
Schwartz does not see a reformed high school such as John Adams
as a panacea for the social problems of this nation which erupt in
high schools as well as elsewhere. "One lesson here is that any
school moving toward a more open curriculum organization, or govern-
ing structure in hopes of reducing conflict or pacifying dissent is
12
doomed to disappointment." As students feel free to direct their
own learning experiences, topics such as drugs, racial antagonisms,
^Robert B. Schwartz in the New York Times : Annual Education
Review, Monday, January 11, 1971, p. 61.
^Schwartz New York Times, p. 60.
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sex, and other classroom "taboos" will come into the open. While
such openness may not solve these problems, as Schwartz has empha-
sized, at least the hypocrisy of an adult world trying to launder
reality for youth will disappear. Students and adults at John Adams
are trying to balance the stress and the rewards of eliminating that
hypocrisy.
During 1970-1971 Brooklyn, New York created John Dewey High
School as a freer alternative to traditional city high schools. Com-
prised of a voluntary student body from Brooklyn districts, the
school represents a broad spectrum of backgrounds and achievement.
Admission is on a first come first serve basis. About one third of
the students are Black or Puerto Rican.
The school has an eight hour day of modularized flexible
scheduling. A course might last anywhere from forty minutes to
eighty minutes a day, offered one or five times a week, and last from
seven to thirty-five weeks. One quarter of a student's time is free
for independent study in the library, resource centers of each depart
ment
,
or in the informal atmosphere of the cafeteria. Students can
complete high school in three, four or five years, with the option of
summer attendance. Individual progress depends on the mastery of pre
scribed course objectives. Students can elect to master a course
entirely on their own using DISK independent study kits, and grades
are essentially pass/fail.
John Dewey's attractive physical plant, located at 50 Avenue X,
and the volunteer status of its students and faculty reflect the
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optimism and high degree of- student participation and initiative at
the school. But as its principal, Sol Levine, formerly head of one
of Manhattan s most notoriously troubled high schools, emphasized,
John Dewey is an alternative, not necessarily a model for immediate
mass emulation. Freedom, responsibility, and happiness are still
essentially alien to most inner-city high schools.
At Polytechnic High School in San Francisco, students have the
option to try out a new kind of high school experience . ^ In 1969,
Polytechnic had hit the bottom when dropout and absenteeism rates
were high, the curriculum had long since lost usefulness and interest
for the students, and its ancient building had been condemned by the
new earthquake regulations. With the aid of consultants from the
Institute for the Advancement of Urban Education, the school set out
to find new structures and curriculum. Students, teachers, parents,
community leaders’, former students, drop-outs, and junior high pro-
spective students were surveyed to find out their views of the high
school and their desires for a new high school.
The most important result of the survey and of many workshops
was the drawing together of the entire community to reform the school.
Students, parents, and educators began talking together and sharing
their concerns and problems. The immediate, tangible result was the
Student-Directed Curriculum (SDC) implemented in Fall, 1971. Through
13The source for the material on Polytechnic High School is a
dissertation by Bobby F. Gentry, "Differentiated Staffing in Urban
Schools" (University of Massachusetts, March, 1972).
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the SDC, students chose topics they wished to pursue. They worked
with teachers to draw up mini-courses for each area of interest.
Each mini-course contained specific content, goals, methods, and
evaluation procedures. Many of the courses called for students
using facilities ai\d involving personnel from the larger community.
A differentiated staff provided the resources to make SDC work.
Topics for the mini-courses ranged from drugs, the law, genetics,
literature, and politics to Black History.
Because the students have a real voice in their curriculum, and
because the participatory process has been real, student and faculty
morale has soared and attendance is significantly improved. Most
important, the community has begun to feel that Polytechnic is "their
school .
"
The Parkway School in Philadelphia has become an exciting model
for high schools of the future throughout the country. The design
of the Parkway School, according to its original Director, John
Bremer, was based on the premise that the high school "has reached
the end of its development. We need a new kind of educational insti-
tution.""*"^ Parkway, a "school without walls," seeks the functional
integration of the educational community with the business and cul-
tural community in Philadelphia. The belief is that for education to
be relevant, especially for an urban youth, it must have some vital
^From a May, 1969 mimeographed booklet, "The Parkway Program,"
published by the Philadelphia School System and the Parkway Program,
p. 5.
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connections to the social, economic, and political structures of the
real world.
The Parkway Program, begun in Fall of 1968, sought a new approach
to curriculum, to the purposes of education, and to student responsi-
bilities. As Bremer described it, "The year round Parkway Program
sets up new boundaries, and provides a new framework in which the
energy of all of us can be used in learning, and not in maintaining
an obsolete, inefficient system." School is not a place, a building
or a classroom, but a process of teaching and learning: "We are,
indeed," Bremer insisted, "a school without walls." 15
The students, volunteers drawn by lot from all Philadelphia's
districts (and some suburban districts)
,
choose their own programs
of study, travel on their own from place to place, and attend school
beyond the traditional nine to three, September to June schedule.
Tutorial groups of about fifteen students, a teacher intern, and a
regular faculty member meet regularly for counseling, work on basic
skills, and personal evaluation. Courses are pass/fail, and the pro-
gram offers a full four year high school program leading to a city-
approved diploma.
The program is an experimental branch of the Philadelphia public
schools and operates at no higher per pupil cost than the regular
high schools. No expensive showcase physical plant is required
—
"classrooms" are scattered all over the Parkway area wherever resources
15Bremer, "The Parkway Program," p. 5.
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are located. Although Parkway has- a regular staff and teacher
interns to provide basic instruction and counseling, many of its
teachers are volunteers from cooperating institutions. The boldness
of involving non-accredited teachers who are professionals from
other fields is perhaps the most significant aspect of Parkway’s
model for urban education of the future.
The city is the curriculum. About 100 businesses, civic
organizations, and cultural institutions, many located along the
Benjamin Franklin Parkway, provide their facilities and staff for
educational programs for Parkway students. Students find at such
varied places as the Franklin Institute, the Museum of Art, the
Insurance Company of North America, Smith, Kline, and French,
station KYW, and the Philadelphia Bulletin and Inquirer opportunities
to learn skills for inquiry, communication, analysis, and research
within a concrete, relevant setting.
The initial success of Parkway rested on its timing with a
reform administration in the Philadelphia schools under a new
Superintendent, Dr. Mark Shedd . It rested equally on the leadership
of Bremer, a forty-four year old British-born former principal in
Two Bridges decentralized school district in New York Citv. Bremer's
description of the political side of education at Parkway aptly
illustrated the political awareness and poetic idealism he para-
doxically embraced: "education and politics are inseparable
activities and... every educational act is a political act." He
welcomed that confusion of the ideal and the real, "for if politics
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is concerned with power, education is concerned with love, and one
without the other is corrupting. Power without love produces
tyranny, love without power produces anarchy." Parkway represented
the necessary union of the educator and the politician "to bring
into harmony these two forces, (for) the future of all of us depends
on the accomplishment of this difficult task."16
Iti the fall of 1970, John Bremer resigned from Parkway. A
growing gulf between Bremer and Superintendent Shedd reached a climax
over the closing of the Paxon School, an elementary pilot expansion
of Parkway. Parkway survived and is now under new management.
Whether it will become more traditional remains an open question.
But in response to the success of Parkway, other districts are plan-
ning similar projects. In 1969-1970 the Metropolitan High School
(METRO) in Chicago was established with the support of the Chicago
Board of EducatioA. Washington, D. C.; Hartford, Connecticut;
Worcester, Massachusetts; and several other cities have made commit-
ments to develop their own school without walls.
Thus, the Parkway model of a "school without walls" may be the
first step in transforming the American high school into a useful,
dynamic institution. At the very least it forces some fresh thinking
about the role of high schools and how they should be linked into the
adult world. In the absence of professional knowledge about what a
high school should look like and train for, it seems important to allow
^Bremer, "The Parkway Program," p. 10.
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students choices and to involve a wide range of non-professionals in
the curriculum.
5. Urban Change Models
As the crisis in urban schools became apparent and no one solu-
tion emerged, many districts set up experimental change models to gain
support, alleviate dissent, and foster the top down through experi-
mental examples of new directions disseminated throughout the system
by demonstration, inservice training, workshops, and change teams.
Curriculum development laboratories, learning centers, innovations
teams, magnet model schools and regional labs all seek to stimulate
curricular, structural and attitudinal reforms by example.
Recently, some cities have opted for system-wide change. The
now classic example of a system-wide attempt at reform is the story
of Mark Shedd ' s super intendency in Philadelphia. The Shedd years
in Philadelphia, from 1967 to 1971, were characterized by aggressive,
massive changes, undertaken with bitter fights, some extraordinary
successes and some dismal failures. Shedd was ousted in Fall, 1971,
after an overwhelming reaction of forces against him helped elect
Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo to Mayor. But the end of the story
of the impact of the Shedd years has yet to be written.
When he took office in 1967, Shedd hired a sparkling staff of
bright non-educators (the "Ivy Maffia") to get the deteriorated
Philadelphia schools back on their feet. To replace the more than
70 percent obsolete and hazardous school buildings, Shedd and his
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supportive Board, including former reform Mayor Richardson Dilworth,
undertook a massive building program. The school budget over the
course of four years more than doubled.
One of the first steps of Shedd's reformers was to open up the
system. They administered city-wide national achievement tests and
published the discouraging results. Board meetings were open to the
public and televised. Students met in weekend retreats for basic
encounter with principals and were given more voice in school
governance
.
Shedd's reforms attracted millions of dollars in federal aid,
and his leadership fostered innovative schools and programs through-
out the city, including the Parkway Program, Pennsylvania Advancement
School, Learning Center projects, a network of "magnet" schools, and
computer—assisted instruction. Philadelphia developed a charismatic
atmosphere for change that attracted young, creative personnel with
new ideas into the central administration as well as many eager new
teachers
.
Real change proved much harder to achieve than the charisma of
change. For most of Philadelphia's children and teachers, schooling
went on as before. The changes were often scattered and unconnected
by an overall strategy for structural reform. Many old-time adminis-
trators felt threatened and resisted the innovation proselytizers
.
Ironically, opening up the system was much of Shedd's undoing.
The changes brought about were dramatic. But many problems—low
achievement, student unrest, racial antagonisms—were not going to
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go away overnight. In one confrontation in 1967, Shedd alienated
Commissioner Rizzo. Rizzo's anti-Shedd campaign calling for hard-
line discipline and more emphasis on the 3R’s spoke for many of
Philadelphia's white blue-collar citizens. "In opening up the system
for inspection, Shedd and Dilworth invited citizens to take a look
at all the problems that had been swept under the rug for so long.
Somehow, Rizzo then succeeded in blaming the new housecleaners for
the mess they had inherited
.
As a result of the Shedd-Rizzo confrontation, the Philadelphia
schools have been increasingly politicized. But the new Superinten-
>
Matthew Costanzo, has inherited a system heady with the taste
of change. Rizzo will probably be held more accountable than any
previous mayor for the success or failure of the schools. It is
tempting to say that Shedd 's efforts were a front-line "suicide
mission" which, wKether necessary or not, brought new life to a dying
system that will no longer accept the status quo.
As the Philadelphia reform administration was facing the end
of its tenure, another city, Louisville, Kentucky, was embarking
on system-wide change. In the fall of 1970, the Louisville School
District began a large-scale program for reform, funded as an EPDA
(Education Professions Development Act) demonstration project.
Louisville is a relatively small city with some ready advantages
for change. Racial balance in the schools is still possible: the
-^Peter Binzen, "Philadelphia: Politics Invades the Schools,"
Saturday Review
,
February 5, 1972, p. 48.
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schools are relatively unpoliticlzed-many teachers are not unionised
or anti-administration; and both Louisville newspapers have supported
the demand for educational change.
The students m Louisville schools are approximately balanced,
black and white. Over a third are very poor—from families with an
annual income of $2,000 or less. Almost three fourths of the dis-
trict's 60,000 children scored below the national average on achieve-
ment tests. Acknowledging that "despite increased staff efforts and
resource utilization, traditional educational approaches "were" not
proving effective in coping with these problems," the Louisville
School District initiated Project Transition, "a series of programs
designed to bring about major changes in its educational structure,
18program and processes." Through the combined support of federal
funds, a forward looking integrated Board, a dedicated new superinten-
dent, Dr. Newman Walker, and cooperation with the University of
Louisville, the program has promise for impact.
All the resources and models for change are being channeled
into fourteen of the system's seventy schools, designated Focus and
Impact Schools. The staffs are differentiated—teachers, Teacher
Corps interns, and paraprofessionals work in teaching teams for
"families" of students. Part of their task is to develop new, rele-
vant curricula for the many poor and minority students. The teacher
is viewed as facilitator, and the principal's role has been revamped
I O
From an unpublished proposal by the Louisville Independent
School District.
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to embody 80 percent instructional time as "principal-learning-
facilitator." Community involvement, sensitivity training, computer-
assisted instruction, imaginative evaluation design, and heterogeneous
grouping in open classrooms are all part of the multi-pronged approach
to change.
The goals of the program are set high, including dramatic
improvement in reading scores, improved attendance records, higher
student self-concepts, and less vandalism and hostile behavior. After
a year, most participants in the bold experiment agreed that prepara-
tions for such massive change were inadequate. Fresh interns and
young teachers found the challenge of openness and freedom, curricu-
lum development, discipline problems, and constant self-evaluation
rather overwhelming. And many parents were skeptical of the apparent
disorder and lack of discipline.
Superintendent Walker reflected after the first year that the
emphasis on personal growth through T-groups was "the right content,
but the process was contradictory." His reform strategy has now
adapted to the more immediate need for community participation.
Neighborhood boards have become major forces in designing and imple-
menting changes. While some of Walker’s original visions have been
curtailed by community desires, his larger hope for "a system of
educational alternatives so that people have a choice" is becoming
a reality.
iqTerry Borton, "Reform Without Politics in Louisville,
Saturday Review
,
February 5, 1972, p. 54.
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Within various urban systems, change models designed to go
beyond reform of an individual school have emerged. The
Pennsylvania Advancement School in Philadelphia is a unique change
model set up as a non-profit corporation, under contract to the
school district of Philadelphia
,
in September, 1967. Supported by
Title I and Title III funds, school district resources, and some
money from private foundations and EPDA, the school was designed as
an experimental curriculum development and staff development institu
tion.
The school itself, located in a renovated warehouse at Fifth
and Luzerne Streets, offers alternative schooling to seventh and
eighth grade "underachieving" boys and girls from the public and
parochial schools. The conspicuous non-school setting is one of the
most striking features of the school. Visitors to the renovated
factory are amazed to find school going on in an environment of open
spaces, carpets, brightly painted walls covered with student art,
posters and photographs, and the free movement of people from place
to place. The students find themselves in a setting which allows
vigorous activity and exploration and encourages informal, honest
relationships with other students and adults.
The corporate autonomy of the school allows for the development
of a unique staff drawn from many fields and experiences. Surveying
the problems and promise of Pennsylvania Advancement School, Henry
Resnik noted:
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The real distinction of the staff, it became clear astime went on, was its being one of the best informed,
most consciously innovative groups of teachers in the
country. One could spend a dav at the Advancement
School and find out just about everything new that washappening in the world of education.
^
Staff members not only develop new curriculum growing out of applied
theories and experience, but are provided with time and support in
writing up the curriculum and sharing it with other schools in the
public school system. Pennsylvania Advancement is a think tank for
curriculum development and human relations, stimulating change in
the traditional system by means of workshops, personnel exchange,
and dissemination of materials.
A somewhat different model, although similar in its goals,
underlay the Washington Innovations Team in Washington, D. C. The
Innovations Team is a group of experienced teachers from the system
who have been released from regular assignments and given the special
task of developing and disseminating curriculum innovations throughout
Washington’s elementary schools. The team runs xrorkshops in new
reading programs and mathematics approaches, supports teachers with
in-service training, and conducts workshops in human relations. Thev
focus on improving education for poor and minority children and
developing curriculum that will meet their needs. Most of the team
are black, and their goals include facilitating inter-racial understand-
ing and more empathetic responses to minority children.
Henry Resnik, Turning on the System : War in Philadelphia
Public Schools (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 76.
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Most urban school systems have resource centers or learning
labs where new ideas are developed. This model inspired the funding
of federal regional laboratories, set up in cooperation with uni-
versities to further educational research and teacher training. The
Northwest Regional Lab cooperates with the University of Oregon and
the Portland Schools in the design and implementation of the John
Adams model high school. Southwest Regional Lab in Los Angeles,
working closely with UCLA, explores new ideas which include teacher
training, reading programs utilizing new technology, and computerized
data processing of student performance. The Center for Urban
Education in New York City works with local universities to publish
research studies on urban education.
The greatest value of these innovation models is the implica-
tion that curriculum and teaching methods should be flexible, con-
stantly up-dated ,' and scrutinized. Laboratory situations which seek
new methods and new content emphasize that there may be many different
ways to teach and learn. They suggest that schools do not have to
be carbon copies of each other; and they hold out hope for variety
and innovation within the system.
Their greatest weakness is the limitation of their impact. Such
changes spread over a large territory and usually aimed at only one
segment of a school or system are often diluted beyond recognition.
School systems have deeply ingrained habits that usually require
more than selective prodding. Without a thorough change in knowledge
and values, behavioral change is likely to be short-lived. Summer
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sensitivity workshops wear off quickly in the press of September's
familiar routine.
A second weakness, the top down approach to instigating change
is difficult to achieve. As Newman Walker in Louisville recognized,
all of the change at the top won’t make any difference unless things
are different in the schools." ^ Studies in change theory suggest
that only through planned group participation is large-scale change
ensured. The real impact of charismatic leadership in the cities
does not come from imposing innovation from above, but from creating
in the city schools and community the hope factor. Teachers become
inspired for success, parents come to believe change is possible,
and those who were previously powerless reenter the democratic
process of public education.
2
1
-‘-Terry Borton, "Reform Without Politics in Louisville,"
Saturday Review
,
February 5, 1972, p. 55.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO FAILURE
AND NON-SCHOOL ALTERNATIVES
Perhaps there was a time when inner city parents believed that
the burden of academic failure fell on their homes and their children's
inadequacies and accepted without question the remoteness of an
unaccountable principal and condescending teachers. But teachers’
strikes and public criticisms of schools have increased political
awareness of parents and community leaders. Parents are questioning
the persistent failures of minority children in an educational system
dominated by white, middle-class educators and bureaucrats.
A disillusionment with liberal rhetoric, with teachers, counsel-
ors and administrators, and with poverty programs has led to the
emergence of new community responses. Within the public school option,
all the varieties of the "community control" concept strive to shake
loose the centralized power of white bureaucrats and to return power
to the local communities the schools supposedly serve. Because many
have become skeptical of the possibility for any real autonomy within
the system, non-public options have mushroomed in inner city communi-
ties: free schools, street academies, mini-schools in store fronts,
community action centers for tutoring, drop-out centers, job training
and job development agencies.
Such alternatives are small-scale and numerous. They avoid the
bureaucratic procedures of pension programs and tenure, lesson plans
to be filed each morning, and expensive commitments to standardized
curriculum. Thus, the schools have far greater flexibility. Further
they have lower per pupil costs than regular school districts.
Community-oriented free schools can be found in every area of
the country. In Boston, three private elementary schools—the New
School for Children, the Roxbury Community School, and the Highland
Park Free School teach children in open classrooms staffed by
teams of certified teachers, community teachers, and parent aides.
In many cities, low budget mini-schools that serve children from a
single city block have sprung up, privately staffed bv parents and
volunteers and funded however possible. The Multi-Culture Institute
in San Francisco serves young children from white, black, Chicano
and Asian-American backgrounds.
The success of these alternatives provides "a model for demon-
strat ion of those principles which public schools have freauentlv
professed and have rarely put into practice."^ Because thev are
innovations from the ground up, thev offer participants the sense of
controlling their own destinies and the hope for change. Their weak-
ness is that by dropping out of the system, they avoid the question
of America’s commitment to equality of education for all in a public
system.
^Joshua L. Smith, "Free Schools: Pandora’s Box," Educat ional
Leadership
,
February, 1971, p. 468.
93
1. A Second Chance—Successful Schools for Dropouts
On the high school level, private alternatives to inner city
public schools serve those the system has already lost or rejected—
the dropouts. In Springfield, Massachusetts, in a former supermarket
in the Northend-Brightwood area, forty-five students are being
trained for college futures at SASSI Prep (Street Academy of Springfield
System, Inc.). The original SASSI Director, William Smith, a young,
black graduate student, founded the school with fellow students from
the University of Massachusetts, School of Education "Action Lab for
the Education of High School Dropouts."
The Action Lab began with research into the problem of high
school dropouts, the "shadow generation," organized field trips and
conferences, made contact with community representatives in Springfield,
undertook fund raising, and then, in the summer of 1970, established a
pilot program. Although still precariously funded, the school opened
full time on October 5, 1970.
SASSI offers college preparation to students from sixteen to
sixty years old. Admission is limited to those who have dropped
out of school for at least four months and are free of drug addiction.
Eleven teaching staff offer core courses, electives, counseling, and a
special emphasis on "testmanship" to students preparing for college
education. As an independent school, SASSI Prep worries little about
state certification and focuses on negotiations with various colleges
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to accept its students on the basis of College Board performance and
their individual experiences at SASSI Prep.
Everyone on the staff
—administrators
,
teachers, even the
secretary—teaches classes. Classes are very small, with frequent
tutoring on a one to one basis. The dedication of the staff is most
clearly reflected in the fact that when funds for staff salaries ran
out from November to February, they kept right on teaching. The
school has struggled through an exciting and precarious first year,
but a measure of its success and credibility with the community is the
fact that the community newspaper, The Brightwood Voice
,
asked SASSI
to take over its publication. In June, 1971, thirteen SASSI Prep
students graduated—all have been accepted in colleges and universi-
ties
.
In Chicago, CAM Academy provides dropouts with a second chance
at high school education. CAM, the Christian Action Ministry, is the
result of the cooperation of eight Protestant and Catholic churches
in the West Garfield Park area. The school offers a tenth grade level
completion certificate and a high school equivalency diploma, and 65
percent of its graduates have gone to college. One CAM student,
Michael, who left public school in order to work, describes why he
came back to school. "You’re free here. You can use your own lan-
guage, so it’s not hard to express yourself to a teacher. In public
schools, the teachers were so busy correcting your English all the
2
time that you forgot what you wanted to say."
2
"Second Chance Academy," Ebony Magazine
,
January, 1971, p. 40.
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CAM Academy Director, Alfred Portis, works closely with
Rev. Albert Mansah, a native of Ghana, who also coordinates a CAM
youth exchange with African nations. CAM is a black self help action
group which also operates day care centers, job placement and train-
ing centers, a small business investment corporation and housing and
youth programs. CAM Academy describes itself as a "tuned-in, turned-
on, brand-new school for dropouts 'n push-outs."^
The well-known prototype for CAM and SASSI is Harlem Prep in
New York City. Now in its third year, the school offers college
preparatory education to some 400 students. Harlem Prep represents
the third tier in a complex of private street academies funded by the
Urban League, foundations, and private corporations to serve high
school dropouts in Harlem. The first level offers the high school
equivalency diploma and job training. A second tier of "transition"
prepares for Harlem Prep or other private schools, and a third tier
provides intensive college preparation.
Harlem Prep's black director, Ed Carpenter, a former boxer, now
is fighting for the support of Harlem Prep, for integrated staff and
students, and for the future of minority kids to compete in American
society. Of the 205 students graduated in the past four years, only
four have not completed a college preparatory degree. The June gradua-
tion, held at the corner of 125th Street and Lennox Avenue near the
Hotel Theresa, represents to many Harlem residents the tangible
success of their high school.
3
"Second Chance Academy," p. 42.
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The street academy model gained national recognition yet has faced
serious financial difficulties. By the late Sixties, corporation
support began to dwindle. "Whatever their successes in salvaging the
system’s ghetto dropouts, they had remained peripheral to the system
that created the dropouts in the first place. In 1969, in an
attempt to create an alternative within the public school option, the
New York Coalition and McGraw-Hill in cooperation with the New York
Board of Education established a pilot mini-school, Harambee Prep.
The 100 students enrolled were still, if barely, on the formal rolls
of the school system. In fall, 1970, Wingate Prep, sponsored by the
Coalition and Pfitzer, Inc., opened in a warehouse storefront in
Brooklyn. In spring, 1971, the New York Board of Education, using
federal and state funds, opened two additional mini-schools.
Although technically alternatives within the city svstero, New
York’s mini-schools owe much of their design and flavor to the private
street academies. The desire for mini—alternative schools has emerged
throughout the system where large, prison-like, impersonalized high
schools have ceased to function as educational institutions. Haaren
High School, a huge (2,500 students) ghetto high school for boys, is
being restructured into a complex of fourteen subject or theme-
oriented schools.
At the mini-schools, students have a voice in selecting their
teachers. The schools provide refuge for dropout students and
^Diane Divoky, "New York's Mini-Schools—Small Miracles, Big
Troubles," Saturday Review, December 18, 1971, p. 60.
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teachers alike. The administrators are energetic and ready to seek
alternatives. Young, black Director of Wingate Prep, Roy Roberts,
presents a striking contrast to typical urban administrators. "What
is so striking about Robert
.infers,perceptiveness to his students'
needs, his flexibility about rules, and his openness about school
problems." The mini-school staffs include street workers, who pro-
vide a direct link between the students’ in-school and out-of-school
problems. Characteristic of the flexibility at Wingate, a teacher
sometimes does street worker duties, and street workers sometimes
teach classes.
Through Roberts’ persistence, the school board has allowed credit
to be given for independent study, community service, work at other
agencies and institutions, and even for time spent in detention.
Parkway type experiences are being developed to give students practi-
cal input for career development.
In contrast to the healthy atmosphere at Wingate Prep, the
larger experiment to transform Haaren High School overnight into a
series of mini-schools has resulted so far in chaos and rigidity.
The rules and regulations of the old system are oddly intertwined
with the new rhetoric. On the first day of newly-instituted inde-
pendent study activities, the principal sent out a mimeographed form
which began, "All college bound students are required to select and
attend a voluntary activity at the end of fifth period."^
^Diane Divoky, p. 62.
^Diane Divoky, p. 67.
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Perhaps the street academies and mini-schools succeeded at once
because of their small size, uniqueness, and peripheral status in the
system. Trying to bring the concept back to the massive high schools
within the system poses many problems yet to be solved by the
reformers at the Urban Coalition and the Board of Education.
2. Westside Study Center
—Curriculum for a Community
The Westside Study Center in Pasadena, California, is a communitv-
action agency providing a wide community curriculum for ghetto resi-
dents whom the public schools have failed. Begun in 1965 as a
neighborhood tutoring center, Westside grew in two years to encompass
job training and job development, adult education, and legal and
social services. "The story of Westside Study Center revealed, through
a kind of revenge imprinting, the failures of urban education in
America. Organized in response to a need for a broad range of self
help programs, the Center showed most clearly what had not been
done
.
Westside Study Center was organized around the idea of self
help. Everyone on the staff was enrolled in some educational program
while helping others further their education. The tutoring program
served young children from the public schools, potential dropouts,
^Atron A. Gentry, unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Hope
Factor: The Growth of the Westside Study Center, 1965-1968," (School
of Education, University of Massachusetts, June, 1970), p. 104.
Dr. Gentry was founder and Director of Westside Study Center from
1965-1968. His dissertation is the primary source for the material
in this section.
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former dropouts or high school graduates seeking further skills,
adult functional illiterates, and college graduates seeking further
training. Members of the staff were both raising their own educa-
tional and experiential levels while passing on their skills to
others. The charismatic atmosphere of hope and possibilities at
Westside brought together young and old, black and white, dropouts
and university professors, businessmen and activists.
Self help involved the subtle problem of creating the power
to control at least a part of one's own life and a part of one's own
community." The concept was complex and paradoxical: "From the
point of view of many in the ghetto, anyone who had boots with straps
g
had already escaped." Through sharing their own struggles with
others, and by taking on increasing responsibilities, the Westside
staff was able to build trust in the community and provide a working
model of self help.
The contrast between Westside 's model of self help and other
welfare and service agencies was striking. Most agencies operated
on the assumption that their clients lacked power, motivation, or
knowledge. They would typically come into the ghetto community and
conduct another survey. "By implication. Blacks and poor people
q
could not even grasp their own plight." Whatever assistance they
offered beyond another set of statistics usually assumed continuation
of the status quo.
^Gentry, p. 12.
^Gentry, p. 14.
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While Westside was developing', the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960's was moving away from appeals to the white majority for legal
and social equality to emphasis on self help and self determination.
The tangible successes of Westside Study Center provided a meeting
ground for both moderate civil rights groups and nationalists, for
white liberals and black activists, for businessmen seeking to improve
their image and for young men and women looking for job opportunities.
The many activities of Westside built a total "curriculum for
the community. Education was formally one of the Center's chief
concerns, but its educational impact extended beyond courses, tutor-
ing, and job training. As people became involved in improving condi-
tions within the community—finding jobs, seeking better housing,
helping youths in court, tutoring children, negotiating with civic
and business leaders in Pasadena—they embarked on the elusive process
of community development. Gradually, the lines of knowledge, pride,
and action were built which made the difference between a fragmented
community and a community gaining control of its destiny.
By contrast, Washington's War on Poverty, founded on the concept
of "maximum feasible participation," was creating just the opposite
process. Poor people's image of the War on Poverty is best summed up
in a selection from the book Black Is : "Black is the warm feeling
you have knowing you've created so many good jobs for whites in the
Poverty Program."^ Beyond replicating the bureaucratic top-heavy
structure of most federal programs, the War on Poverty also failed to
lOTurner Brown, Jr., Black Is (New York: Grove Press, 1969).
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respond to community leadership or potential power-for obvious
reasons—and seemed to many .mere riot prevention. "Most community
action groups found money available only during the summer months
and mainly for activities involving youths ... Community action had
somehow become community inaction." 11 Through repeated disappoint-
ments over federal funding, the Westside Study Center learned that
self help also meant self sufficiency.
Westside’s Community Forum illustrated the Center’s charisma
and impact on community development. Each week fifty to two hundred
local community residents, Pasadena businessmen, and University
professors and students gathered at Westside to hear lectures and
panel discussions. The topics ranged from job opportunities,
African history, and black power to the American Nazi Party, the
John Birch Society, and drug abuse. The Community Forum provided a
new kind of grass roots adult education. It exposed poor people to
ideas and personalities that newspapers and television rarely afforded.
The failure of the Pasadena public schools to educate poor and
minority children provided the mandate for Westside Study Center. Its
founders believed that Westside should not have to exist. A group of
"non-professionals" succeeded where the professionals had given up
or never tried in the first place. Westside’s self help programs
provided a way out of the so-called cycle of poverty by creating a
vital link between those in power and those without power. "In
11Gentry, p. 93.
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simplest terms, Westside succeeded- because people wanted to come.
No better test for schools could be devised." 12
3* The Sesame Street Revolution
In 1969-1970, seven million kids turned on to mass media educa-
tion. In Sesame Street, they saw the first national, non-commercial
educational program for pre-school children. 13 Undoubtedly, after
Sesame Street
,
school will never be the same.
The creators of Sesame Street
,
Joan Gantz Cooney and the
Children s Television Workshop, capitalized on their unique position
to create this educational experience. They had the new medium of
television as a rationale for reexamining traditional assumptions
about education and learning. The impact and success of their efforts
suggest they asked the right questions.
In the year of planning and research that preceded the first
show, the Workshop staff first asked, "How do we reach the children?"
This vital question, dictated by the nature of the television medium
is asked far too seldom in educational circles. They began with
researching what would appeal, draw and hold attention.
Their preliminary research turned up some startling conclusions
(not startling perhaps to parents, but startling to educational
l2Gentry, p. 130.
1 TSesame Street is supported by the U. S. Office of Education,
Carnegie Foundation, Ford Foundation, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, and many companies and volunteer groups. The show
produces its "product" for less than lq per child per day.
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experts and past producers of T.V. fare for children). They found
pre-school children to be a much more sophisticated and "intelligent"
audience than was generally assumed. The children responded to a
fast pace, quick changes, slapstick comedy, and multi-sensory stimuli.
Imagine the revolution in school curriculum if the first questions
the educators examined were: How do we get their attention? What
interests them and holds their interest? What do they like?
A common trait of the Children's Television Workshop staff is
their modesty--modesty about their educational impact and modesty
about their goals. They reiterate that they have no intention of
pre-empting teachers and schools. The program makes no attempt to
present an intact, complete curriculum. The need for Sesame Street
grew out of the need for education for the twelve million three to
five-year olds, a huge percentage of whom were not in schools and
would not be able to attend schools.^
The vehicle for reaching these children seemed obvious, since
(according to the Neilson Index) children under six averaged 54.1
hours per week watching television. Research on the importance of
pre-school experiences underlined the impact of inadequate education
on poor and minority children who entered schools behind in basic
skills before they began. The television for them, as well, was an
obvious vehicle, since even in homes with income less than $5,000
^Ninety-four percent of three-year olds; eighty-four percent
of four-year olds; twenty-five percent of five-year olds. From
Television for Preschool Children: A Proposal
,
Joan Gantz Cooney,
February 19, 1968.
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per year, 90 percent had television sets. The authors of Sesame
Street set out to reach this huge audience in need of education and
to gear the content specifically toward children in inner cities.
In setting up what educational goals to pursue, the Workshop
staff again demonstrated invaluable openmindedness. They did not
presume they knew the waj, but opted for a wide variety of ways,
carefully researched for effectiveness.
In the fall of 1970, after the first full year of Sesame Street
Mrs. Cooney wrote:
The year of innovative production and the more than a
full year of painstaking research that preceded it has
proved what the Workshop wanted most of all to demon-
strate: that television has the potential to reach and
teach virtually every pre-school child in this country
regardless of his background, that television can provide
him with the constructive entertainment and intellectual
stimulation he critically needs to begin growing up with
a sense of accomplishment, pride and dignity.
To establish' the learning curriculum for the first year of pro-
duction, the ETW staff worked closely with its research department
and advisors from the fields of education, psychology, and social
science. They drew up a clearly-defined list of educational goals,
stated in terms of behavioral objectives, in the categories of:
symbolic representation (numbers, letters, geometric forms), cogni-
tive processes (perception, relationships, ordering, reasoning and
problem solving), physical environment, and social environment. To
translate these objectives into programs, the production staff drew
•^Joan Gantz Cooney, "Memo From The Children's Television
Workshop," 1970.
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on fields as varied as education, entertainment, and commercial
advertising. The variety in their staff is reflected in the variety
of approaches the show utilizes
: cartoons, songs, live characters,
puppets, film shorts, humor, pathos, repetition, and direct instruc-
tion.
Much of the charm of Sesame Street ' s methods derives from the
implied respect for children's wit and perception. People and puppets
often play jokes on themselves and each other, and no one worries
that the lesson will be lost at the expense of humor. For example,
in one sequence a huge letter "W" rests next to Kermit the frog
who is describing the usefulness of "W’s." Meanwhile, behind his
back, a monster puppet is busily eating away at the letter, forcing
Kermit to change his lecture topic from W to N to V to I.
A spirit of optimism and experienced success permeates every
level of the staff at Children's Television Workshop. A visit to
the set at Teletape Productions, 81st and Broadway, is a trip into
humor, music, color, and warm and relaxed human interaction. The
mood is informal—children move about and play on bikes and swings
during and in between tapings. The Director, Bob Myhrum, encourages
spontaneous dialogue and experimentation. Visitors and production
staff move about casually. The human characters and the puppets
work and play in a spirit of sustained fantasy—Big Bird is real,
with or without a camera on him.
On the set and at the Workshop, one is struck by the enjoyment
and understanding of the staff at all levels. Much of the success of
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Sesame S treet is due to a total staff dedicated to their goals
and trained together in an understanding of these goals. The camera-
men, the actors, the researchers seem to share an enthusiastic con-
sensus of what they are about.
In the summer of 1970, the entire Sesame Street cast went on a
nationwide tour to initiate a series of Utilization Programs. In
fourteen major cities audiences of up to 15,000 children showed up.
In some places children traveled from other counties, brought in
busses and cars by parents and volunteers. Under the direction of
Evelyn Davis and her assistant, Charley Smith, "Utilization" is
growing to be one of the most exciting spin-offs of Sesame Street’s
success. Their goals: to spread the word of Sesame Street and to
increase the potential audience, especially in the original target,
inner city populations.
In the schools, Utilization hopes to encourage, not the showing
of Sesame S tr eet
,
but reinforcement and follow-up of lessons from the
show. In Detroit, as of February 6, 1970, 25,000 four-year olds are
attending experimental compulsory Saturday pre-schools, using Sesame
Street as part of their curriculum. In New Jersey a federally-funded
Title VII (ESEA) program is underway to research bilingualizing
Sesame Street through the cooperation of Children's Television Workshop
and the Jersey City State Bilingual Program. In Dallas, a model three-
year old day care center is being established involving Sesame Street
as its focus and reinforcing lessons from the program.
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The Utilization Program seeks
• cooperation from federal, state
and local agencies, volunteer grouns, and community leaders to make
the program more accessible, especially in areas where VHF stations
are not available,
.mtd»A~. i££s <f *vays to increase follow-through with
parents and teachers. Groups as diverse as the Junior League, private
industry, and block associations have volunteered time, space and
television sets. A present field staff of fifty-five is active and
growing. Recruited from inner city communities, most are from
minority groups and experienced in community participation. The real
hope of Mrs. Davis and her staff is to initiate activity that will
produce enduring community action, concern and education.
Much of the impact of Sesame Street is on the parents. When a
mother sees her child learning from the television program, she
realizes he can and should also learn in school. The Sesame Street
Mothers' Project" has initiated workshops for mothers to provide
specific tools for participating in their children's education. Bv
gaining hope for their own children and discovering ways to be more
effective parents, many mothers grow in self-esteem.
In fall, 1971, Children's Television Workshop launched a new
half-hour program designed to help seven to ten year olds learn
reading. The Electric Company shares many of the features that
make Sesame Street appealing— fast pace, humorous incidents, an
integrated cast, music, and cartoons. Each sequence presents lin-
guistic problems or new words in a remarkably painless way. Dire con-
sequences come to cartoon characters who are slow to read such warnings
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as "Do not bother the giant;- in Vie's Diner, patrons learn about the
silent "e"; Easy Reader teaches Bill Cosby some useful words; Fargo
North, Decoder, helps desperate people rearrange mysterious messages;
and Love of Chair" parodies soap operas while teaching words.
After the first eight weeks of broadcasting, Educational Testing
Service researched learning gains in children who watched Electric
Company in school. Of the 200 second graders who were tested, the
half who watched Electric Company showed "a consistent edge over
non-viewers" in tests of basic reading skills. Children's Television
Workshop also reported that four million children watch the Electric
Company
,
two million of them in schools. Commissioner Sidney Marland
observed that it typically takes fifteen years for an educational
innovation to reach three percent of the classrooms in schools. The
Electric Company has already reached forty percent of its intended
audience. "Perhaps no other innovation in the history of education
has made itself felt among so many people in so short a time." 16
From educational television in Boston, a new children's program,
ZOOM, transmits less didactic messages but clearly conveys an educa-
tional theme. The show is by, for
,
and about children. Its integrated
cast of young people choose and write their own material. The viewing
audience is invited to send in Z00MCARDS with suggestions for the show
and responses to questions and surveys. Films made by children,
-^Summarized in the Report on Educational Research
(Washington, D. C.: Capital Publications, Inc.), March 1, 1972,
p. 8.
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interviews with children, shots of children making pottery or playing
sports, games, songs, and slapstick comedy all convey the creative
potential of children and the fun of children learning and teaching
their own "curriculum."
Se^ Street, Westside Study Center, and independent community
schools serve the needs of urban children and adults who have been
given up for lost by public school systems. They demonstrate that
schools can be fun and entertaining, that education can occur in
environments open to the streets and can be taught by non-professionals
involved with hundreds of "non-school" activities.
Community alternatives prove to the public school systems that
education can work in a low cost, non-bureaucrat ic structure, highly
value-charged with hope, freedom, and flexibility. Each example
cited breaks the status quo—the failure of urban schools, the
f set iveness of most community agencies, and the insipid monotony
of most commercial television. They explode the myth that non-
professionals and non-experts cannot contribute to and change
institutionalized education.
All of the informal, non-public, and non-school alternatives
have in common freedom from the difficult problems of classroom
management and school bureaucracy. Because their clients are
volunteers—no truancy laws enforce attendance—they have to provide
a needed service, be entertaining and empathetic, and respond to
individual needs. Beyond empathy and entertainment they only succeed
to the degree that they have something to offer. They are, in part,
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a mirror of what is not being done in public education and community
services
.
CHAPTER V
URBAN EDUCATION AND CHANGE
111
Although theories about how to change institutions have seldom
dealt directly with urban schools, change agents in urban education
have been tempted to turn to identified experts in change theory.
The result of their frustration has been two myths: First, that
research will finally reveal a recipe for the design and implementa-
tion of educational change—as soon as enough time and money is spent
on research. Second, that "the more schools change, the more they
stay the same"—the myth of powerlessness.
1. The Myth of a Recipe for Change
Iti the field of urban education in particular, change theory
has been woefully inadequate to describe the complex interactions of
institutionalized white racism which have produced unequal education.
The search for useful change theories in urban education has been
discouraging. A major branch of educational change theory has been
modeled after studies in industrial settings, as though schools and
factories have a lot in common. A recent survey of the literature
on educational change theory concluded that "the practicing school
administrator can find very little practical help in the literature
for planning and managing, and dealing with the problems of change."^
^Louis Maguire, Observations and Analysis of the Literature on
Change
.
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Research for Better Schools, Inc.,
June
,
197 0) , p . 1
.
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Contemporary change theorists usually strive to present a
convincing, discrete set of analytical factors, implying that manage-
ment techniaue is the key to change for the better. Kurt Lewin
postulated three steps in the change process: "unfreezing, moving,
and re-freezing at a new level." 2 Egon Guba described three change
processes: evoluntary (unplanned)," "homeostatic or reactive,"
and "neomobilistic or planned" change. 3 The National Training
Laboratories suggested a model of planned change which had eight
phases, from diagnosis of the problem to providing, support for the
changed behavior, and termination of the helping relationship
.
4
Warren Bennis defined eight types of change, focusing on the rela-
tionship between a change agent and client system, and ranging from
democratic, "planned change" or "coercive »" and "emulative
change
.
The student of change theorv, or the educational innovator
looking for guidance, feels overwhelmed and confused bv the endless
2Kurt Lewin, "Ouasi-Stationarv Social Equilibria and the Problem
of Permanent Change," The Planning of Change
,
First Edition,
Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, editors
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961).
Egon G. Guba, "A Model of Change for Instructional Development."
Paper presented for the Educational Media Conference, Indiana
University, June, 1968.
^Reading Book
,
Twentieth Annual Summer Laboratories in Human
Relations Training (Washington
,
D. C. : National Training
Laboratories, 1966).
^Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1966).
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"lists" and seemingly disconnected, self-contained systems. If there
is no one set of answers, are there any answers at all? William
McClelland, a leader in motivational research, readily admits the
dilemma: "It is premature to do more than wish for a general model,
let alone a general theory of change and changing. Accordingly,
researchers have developed a variety of subsystem models, each of
which deals with some aspect of the change process or with some
specific setting. The implication in McClelland's statement is that
change theory is a young field which is developing into a science.
That prediction seems overly optimistic.
For the student of urban education, the most useful sources of
change literature still lie in case studies which document the change
process. Few examples exist in the published literature. The best
include: Reginald Damerell's Triumph in a White Suburb
,
on integra-
tion; David Roger's 110 Livingston Street
,
about the New York City
educational bureaucracy: and Marilvn Gittell and Maurice Berube's
Confrontation in Ocean-Hill Brownsville
,
about the New York Teacher's
Strike. Such studies at least provide some of the scope and complexity
of urban educational change, the raw materials for understanding
change processes in a broader context.
The Director of Research at the Pennsylvania Advancement School
in Philadelphia, Saul Yanofsky, reported that his goal to support
^William A. McClelland, "The Process of Effecting Change."
Paper presented to the Division of Militarv Psychology, Division 19,
of the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San
Francisco, September, 1968.
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educational change through research went through three stages:
In the first year, he tried to adapt the best of educational research
to studying the school's progress—and was often frustrated with the
inadequacy of ’ iv-nts
. In the second year, he discovered
that whatever his research findings, they had little or no bearing
on whether the school was supported within the system
—
political
exigencies were far more relevant. Finally, he concluded that his
most useful role was in stimulating historical documentation of the
school through films, personal statements, and documentaries—
a
retreat from psychometrics to a human record of what happened. 7
A recent book by Semour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School
anc^ the Problem of Change
,
is perhaps the bravest effort to generalize
the specific content of change in schools. In Sarason 's words, "we
do not possess adequate descriptions of the change process so as to
allow us to begin to understand the high frequency of failure or the
8
occasional successes." His contribution is a lucid, thorough
description of the problem of understanding change processes in
educat ion.
Sarason reiterates the inadequacy of change theory and research
modeled after studies in industrial settings: "Whereas I have stronglv
emphasized the need for descriptions of the modal process of change...
7From an interview with Saul Yanofsky at Pennsylvania Advancement
School, Fall, 1970.
O
Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem
of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 60.
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these writers (for the most, part) seem to assume that we know the
modal process." The thematic question running through the book is,
How is it that the more things change, the more they stay the same?
Sarason draws his answers from extensive experience working in
schools while establishing the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic. He
begins by pointing out that outsiders (even insiders) do not recognize
the complexity of resistance to change. The source of the resistance
is usually the failure of both the observers and the observed to
think in terms of alternatives
.
Sarason calls for an understanding of the total "school culture"
an ecological approach. Descriptions of the change process must
include
:
— relationships among professionals within the school
setting
— relationships among professionals and pupils
— relationships among professionals and the larger
society.
Thus, he devotes a chapter to the principal, "the crucial implementor
of change." In his observations, most principals view themselves as
victims of external forces and changes—thus the "it can't be done"
syndrome. In another chapter, he points out how snowed under teachers
are with the boredom and routine of teaching. How can they make
education interesting to children if it bores them? Certainly, those
problems are more true of urban schools with a history of failure
^Sarason, p. 216.
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than of suburban schools. One crucial weakness in Sarason 's
analysis is that he fails to explore the alternative route of new
staffing patterns as one way out of impossible and rigid professional
roles
.
Sarason is at his best when he describes some of the causes of
resistance to change and the rigidity of educational imagination.
Certain programmatic regularities (such as physical education in
school or self-contained kindergartens) do have alternatives, but
when questioned, arouse tremendous feeling—as if basic American
traditions were being attacked. In fact, the intended outcomes of
such practices have never clearly been stated, and no one checks to
see if the outcomes actually come about. For example, most educators
talk about dialogue in the classroom between teachers and students
and emphasize the "discovery process" for students. Yet in one
study, the frequency of teachers' questions versus students' questions
was about one hundred to one
. We rarely apply such scrutiny to most
educational processes.
Sarason criticizes instant panaceas for solving educational
problems. "It is not that these single or simple solutions are in
themselves wrong or inadvisable but rather they are viewed as ends,
which if reached will in some mystical way change the quality of life
in the classroom and school. His emphasis on viewing the total
school culture rules out blaming failures on individuals alone (bad
principals, bad teachers, or disadvantaged children).
lOSarason, p. 225.
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Seeing the enormity and complexity of the problem and recognizing
the difficulty of understanding and initiating change is not, for
Sarason, a call for defeatism: "There are few things, if any, that
are for demonstrating the dynamics of the
prophecy." Sarason 's basis for hope echoes the theme
of the value of success: "Recognizing the adversary gives one a
basis for asserting that the problem is neither hopeless nor
insoluble
.
If change agents would give up trying to find a single explana-
tion and turn to understanding the total environment, they might
recognize that the complexity and connectedness of the "total school
culture" allows for a great variety of approaches. No matter what
the barrier is, including lack of money, it can be overcome if one
is willing to try alternatives.
2. Ingredients for Change
Despite all the diversity and variation in examples of success-
ful urban schools, there are some common threads. These ingredients
are not only common, but readily available in most communities and
schools. What is needed is the right mix of ingredients at the right
time. The task for creative leadership is to create the series of
episodes which make up the change process for institutions.
11Sarason, p. 227; p. 236.
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Educational theorists since John Dewey have known fairly clearly
what good education should look like. We may not know much about
how children learn, but we do know what settings and interpersonal
relationships seem copdvc
J
horning : openness and freedom with
adult guidance and
,
peer support; high student self-image, confidence,
and a sense of control over one's own destiny; reality-based educa-
tion wherein everything outside the school does not deny what goes
on inside the school; and the hope factor of self help, participation,
and a foreseeable better future.
In most of the examples cited, an in-depth democratic process
of group planning and participation took place which involved all
those affected by the changes. At Parkway and SASSI Prep, frequent
all-school meetings gave students and teachers, frustrated with the
challenge of change, a chance to blow off steam and express concerns.
At Luther Seabrook's school, parents were drawn into the planning
process at every opportunity. In Berkeley, California, the acceptance
of integrated schools rested almost entirely upon the slow, pain-
staking education of the parents and teachers through numerous candid
meetings
.
Closely related to the element of patient, democratic processes
is the relaxed and warm atmosphere of mutual respect and fun. In
a secure environment people feel free to express their ideas and
emotions— to learn. It is probably no coincidence that one feels the
same atmosphere on the set of Sesame Street as in the classrooms at
Pennsylvania Advancement School. In both situations, the full range
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of human emotions and talents—humor
,
fear, pride, stubbornness—are
encouraged, not just a narrow range of behaviors supposedly suitable
for learning.
In schools without walls, community free schools, in the open
classrooms in Louisville Focus and Impact schools, teachers and
administrators are realizing the motivating potential of a reality-
based curriculum. By facing directly the realities of racism, poverty
and powerlessness, educators discard a make-believe world of irrele-
vant lessons and build trust and credibility. The schools thereby
open their doors to non-professionals from the urban community and
set students free from the four walls of the classroom. Vocation
and education, school and real life, become reconnected.
Finally, all the various schools and programs shared in common
a positive approach. In Berkeley, Neil Sullivan said that the
schools must integrate "because it is right!" At I.S. 44 in New York,
Luther Seabrook expects positive results and gets them. Success rests
on the assumption that human lives can be greatly altered. "We need
to give black children back their right to dream," Loretta Long,
"Susan" of Sesame Street
,
believes. "By keeping dreams alive we
keep alive the stamina and motivation to achieve." When parents,
teachers, and children find the hope factor for themselves, they also
find the hope factor for urban schools.
A study of the kind of leaders who succeed in changing urban
education would prove valuable. But seeking conclusions on objective
criteria like sex, age, race, educational training, or experience is
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probably futile. Edythe Gaines is a grandmother, whose expertise
grew from intimate knowledge of the New York City schools (and only
incidently from a Harvard Ph.D.). Her district is over fifty percent
Puerto Rican, and she is black. Some of the most dynamic principals
in New York ghetto
. elementary schools are Jewish. Some reformers
are quite young and daring; some are older and experienced in the
intricacies of educational politics.
Harvey Scribner, a tough, shrewd New Englander from a poor, rural
background, had never dealt with problems of integration before
Teaneck. John Bremer brought to Parkway a strict, classical British
education. Newman Walker, Superintendent of Louisville, is a quiet,
—spoken man who firmly believes in humanistic approaches to
problem-solving. Richardson Dilworth, the man behind the hiring of
Mark Shedd and whose leadership is largely credited for reforming
Philadelphia's municipal structures, is a "Mainline" aristocrat.
The role of powerful leadership in creating change is a central
question. In the examples of school integration, the balance seemed
tipped when educational and civic leaders met the problems head on
and dared to bring out into the open the "hidden agenda" of racism.
The positive approach of principals in holding teachers accountable
and convincing them that their children can learn seems crucial in
urban elementary schools.
On the other hand, strong leadership is often not enough.
Creativity and imagination provide the necessary vision for dramatic
departure from the status quo. The success of Sesame Street depended
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on the outstanding inventiveness of its creators and the skillful
research which proceeded it. The Parkway concept provided a revolu-
tionary structure for urban high school education. Perhaps some
concepts, such as schools without walls or differentiated staffing
and flexible scheduling, are so dramatic in the structural changes
they bring that they can survive, once implemented, without charis-
matic leadership.
In the urban setting, knowledge of the political framework is
essential. Without having a good idea of the political consequences
of one s actions, an urban leader will become immobilized. And yet,
political awareness all too often becomes ensnared in petty self-
seeking. It is said of Chancellor Scribner in New York that much of
his power rests on his reputation that "he can't be bought." As
Edythe Gaines stated, an educational leader will be effective only
when he or she keeps clearly in mind the ultimate goal of improving
education for children.
An educational leader first needs the courage and confidence to
say it can and it will be done. If he feels he needs to find a
recipe for successful change, he has lost already. Secondly, he needs
those intangible intuitive skills, the "whimsy" factor, which provide
adaptability and flexibility. Third, a leader needs to find and
create a series of episodes that go right—and he must be willing to
risk their going wrong. Finally, the vision of what is important—
the education of children--provides all those involved in the change
process with the belief that the stakes are real and that the goals
are worth trying.
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3. The Myth of Powerlessness
Too often educational reformers have either not dared very much
or simply given up. In self-justification, they have insisted that
"the more things change, the more they stay the same." For those who
equate sophisticated cynicism with wisdom, an emphasis on the pos-
sibility of progress will seem naive. The brief answers sketched
here may not be convincing, but may suggest the direction required
for a deeper understanding of change.
A major part of the answer to the myth of powerlessness lies
in defining the area and specific type of change being talked about.
In fact, schools are continually changing. Few institutions undergo
a higher turnover of personnel and clients. Communities rapidly
change as suburbs grow and poor and minority people move to the inner
cities—and school populations reflect that change. Secondly, parents
and teachers find that children absorb the changes in the larger
society at an alarming rate and create the "generation gap."
If one’s perspective stretches away from the immediate and
chronic problem of getting curriculum updated and passes lightly over
the extreme examples of classrooms with thirty-year old textbooks, it
is clear that there have been remarkable changes in school curriculum.
Probably the most obvious changes have been in the sciences and in
occupational education. Social studies, sex education, and languages
have also reflected the dramatic changes in society. Hopefully, at
long last, more high school students read the Autobiography of
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^Solm X than Si l as Marner . Perhaps the problem is that schools
have not changed fast enough to respond to new student populations,
the climate of outside opinion, and contemporary events.
When one looks at schools, part of the problem in change is
merely a problem of management. It is, in fact, an enormous manage-
ment task to orchestrate all the scheduling, orderly interactions,
personnel assignments, financial resources, transportation, meals,
space, and supplies that go into a public school. The management
problem will remain, whatever the nature of urban schools. An
environment has to be created in which education can take place. But
the content having something to teach within the managerial struc-
ture— is the key to successful education. Urban schools have failed
primarily because they have not taught their students.
It is much easier for experts in urban education to agree unon
the need for change than for them to agree about what should be
changed and how. In general, educational change theorists have looked
for a recipe for successful change and, thus, have been forced to
deal with routines and regularities—the managerial problems. The
goals are stated in terms of a new reading series or a new class
schedule when the real goal is changing what is taught—what is
useful, meaningful, and enjoyable to learn. The hopes pinned on each
innovation have been larger than it could bear.
The demand for change comes when schools fail to train, educate,
and facilitate learning of those things that their graduates need to
know. General diplomas instead of academic diplomas and fifth grade
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reading level of graduates
-condemn urban schools more than high
dropout rates, truancy, or vandalism.
Even when the problem was correctly identified as what is
taught-as in the introduction of the "new math"-the change strategy
became an attack on programmatic regularities. Every elementary
teacher had to learn a new educational dogma. Teachers were often
as threatened by the "new math" as by the old, and they frequently
transferred that fear to their students. Although the hope that
more children would be turned on by mathematics was hardly realized,
the basic direction in curriculum reform was for the better.
It makes a great deal of difference how educational change is
conceived and implemented. Changing what is taught is much more
difficult than changing managerial techniques. We want to teach
something useful that students can enjoy as well. Finding that
"something" is particularly hard because it relates to future
proj ections
.
The salient question underlying research in urban education
must finally be: What are the schools for in our society? The
failure of urban schools becomes increasingly a crisis as the role
of public education grows in social and economic importance. Are we,
as Mario Fantini suggested, "asking public schools to become the
major instrumentation for solving many of our social ills
—
poverty,
racism, alienation, powerlessness—while also responding to the
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manpower needs of an advanced technological society?"12 if the
answer to that question is yes, then the need for success in urban
schools, and for research which can both document and stimulate that
success is also the key to the future health of American society.
It is extremely important that urban schools, alone, not be
saddled with the task of producing change models for American educa-
tion. In a sense, their task is easier—equality is the goal. What-
ever the flaws within the American educational system, the first
task of urban schools is to insure that poor and minority children
have equal access and results within that system.
Finding what to teach and how to teach it is the greatest chal-
lenge to educational change. Certainly, changing managerial struc-
tures and routines can facilitate that search. If the search is,
in fact, a continuous one, then schools must become self-renewing
institutions in which students, teachers, administrators, and parents
can determine the directions of the search.
4. The Illusion of Power and the Hope Factor
Successful change strategies rest directly on creating an illu-
sion of power—on convincing people that they have a voice in decisions
and an impact on what happens. Institutions are, however trite the
phrase, made up of individuals. The shape and directions of
12Mario Fantini, "Educational Agenda for the Seventies and
Beyond," from Needs of Elementary and Secondary Educat ion for the
Seventies, compiled by the General Subcommittee of Education of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, p. 191.
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institutions depend most upon the hopes, fears, and expectations of
people. At crucial stages, when institutional decisions are in the
balance, the outcome turns upon creative leadership which builds
on pos it ivt’hiopes' \'al¥i^c*^han plays on fears.
Urban schools^-because they have been programmed for failure
by a larger white racism—convey exaggerated fears and a diminished
sense of power. Because success cannot be taken for granted in
urban schools, it is crucial to create the illusion of power.
Success, therefore, is the prime component of creating success.
Predicting failure almost guarantees failure. Urban teachers and
administrators who believe they will succeed usually find their faith
justified
. Every urban teacher can find another teacher who succeeds
5
urban school can find another school that succeeds; every dis-
trict and every city can look to an urban district or system that
succeeds
.
The purpose of this study has been, not to create an elaborate
theory of change, but to take the crucial first step in breaking
the myth of failure in urban education. "It is the successful
experiment which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures
which preceeded it. More is learned from the single success than
from the multiple failures. A single success proves it can be
, ,,13done
.
^Robert Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," The Antioch
Review
,
Summer, 1948 (reprinted in Merton, Social Theory and Social
Structure, New York: Free Press, revised and enlarged edition, 1957).
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Emphasizing success in. this study has started with the recogni-
tion that the urban poor, and especially black Americans, have been
denied membership in the American Dream of upward mobility and
progress. The challenge to urban schools is to share that dream—to
recreate the hope factor for poor and minority children.
The hope factor "touches on the core of humanness— the fact
that men wish to strive, wish to be important, and wish to do some-
thing significant with their lives. The hope factor makes
democracy work. When urban schools deny hope, they denv a viable
future for American society.
1Z
*From the introduction to Urban Educat ion: The Hone Factor
(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1972).
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
Chapter I
The major resource for the ideas in Chapter I has been mv
activities in the Center for Urban Education, from January, 1969, to
the present. I learned most about urban education while working to
establish programs, to build a curriculum, to recruit new members
to the Center, and while teaching an undergraduate course. "Intro-
duction to Urban Education." I traveled to schools in Hartford,
Connecticut; Pasadena, California* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: and
New York City and had the opportunity to meet with teachers, students,
administrators, community leaders, and federal program coordinators.
I learned most about the problems and prospects for an integrated
society through participating in building an integrated team of
faculty and students in the Center.
Several major nation-wide studies have examined the failure of
urban education and have documented the extent of racial separation
in American schools: James A. Coleman, Equality of Educ ational
Opportunity (Washington: G.P.O., 1966); U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (Washington: C.P.O.,
1970 ) ; and Wilson C. Riles, Urban Education Task Force Report : Firal
Report of the Task Force on Urban Education to the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (New York: Praeger, 1970).
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Four books in particular do an outstanding job of presenting
the individual and collective histories of the victims of white
racism in America: Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (Mew
York: Grove Press, 1966); Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto : Dilemmas of
S ocial Power (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965);
Elliot Liebow, Tally’s Corner (Boston: Little Brown, 1967); and
Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, eds., Institutional Racism in
America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
Charles Silberman's Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random
House, Vintage Books, 1964) remains a good summary of racism and the
struggle for civil rights.
William Ryan's Blaming the Victim (New York: Random House,
1971); Charles Valentine's Culture and Poverty (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1968); and Samuel F. Yette's The Choice : The
Issue of Black Survival in America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1971) from a powerful triumverate of denials to the myths that have
shifted the blame for failure in urban education from the schools to
the children and their families.
Four contemporary studies of urban education offer proof that
success does and can occur: Eleanor Leacock, Teaching and Learning
in Citv Schools (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Robert Rosenthal and
Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom : Self-Fulfilling
Prophecies and Teacher Expectations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1968); Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New
130
York: Random House, 1970); and Atron A. Gentry, et
. al., Urban
Education : The Hope Factor (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1972).
Chapter II
The primary sources for Chapter II are the two documentations
of integration in Teaneck, New Jersey and Berkeley, California:
Reginald Damerell, Triumph in White Suburb (New York: Morrow
and Company, 1968) and Neil Sullivan and Evelyn S. Stewart, Now
l£ The Time: Integration In The Berkeley Schools (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1970).
The most reasoned and convincing discussion of the need for
integration to end racial fears and antagonisms is Thomas F.
Pettigrew’s "Racially Separate or Together," Journal of Social Issues
,
25, No. 1, 1969, pp. 43-69. Raymond W. Mack’s Our Children's Burden:
Stud ies of Desegregation in Nine American Communit ies (New York:
Random House, 1968) describes the slow process of integration in
American schools.
Many newspaper and magazine articles, too numerous to list here,
have described schools which have integrated through bussing. In the
flurry of election-year campaigning in spring, 1972, feature articles
and television specials have depicted the successes and failures of
school integration.
It is probably premature to make conclusive statements about the
effects of integrated schools on students’ achievement and self-image.
In "Race and the Outcomes of Schooling" in On Equality of Educational
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Opportunity
,
Frederick Hosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. (New
York: Random House, 1972), David K. Cohen, Thomas F. Pettigrew,
and Robert T. Riley cite the extensive research of Professor Irwin
Katz that "black subjects performed best in inter-racial situations
free of stress and threat, moderately well in all-Negro situations,
and worst in inter-racial situations characterized by stress and
threat." (p. 359) In recent studies by Nancy St. John and M. S. Smith,
black children achieved higher in integrated schools yet reported
higher educational aspirations in segregated schools. One explana-
tion, the authors hypothesize, could be the effects of racism on
black children in integrated schools. Another, put forward by Irwin
Katz, is that "the high aspirations of lower-status Negro children
in overwhelmingly Negro schools tend to be rigid and unrealistic"
(p. 364)
,
leading to disappointment and despair when the child cones
in contact with the larger society.
Chapter III
The primary sources for Chanter III were on-site visits to
urban schools and programs and interviews with people connected with
those programs. Several books and articles, however, were useful:
Charles E. Silberman's Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random
House, 1970); George Dennison's The Lives of Children : A Practical
Description of Freedom in its Relat ion to Growth and Learning : The
Story of the First Street School (New York: Random House, 1969:
Henry S. Resnik's Turning on the System : War in the Phi ladelphia
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Public Schools (New York:
-Random House, Pantheon Books, 1970); and
George Weber's study, "Inner-City Children Can Be Taught To Read:
Four Successful Schools," Washington, D. C.: Council for Basic
Education, Occasional Papers Number Eighteen, 1971. The taped
interview with Edythe Gaines, former Superintendent of District 12
in the Bronx, made by Reginald Damerell, filled a crucial gap in
providing the success story of an entire inner-city district.
In fall, 1970, I visited New York City and interviewed Luther
Seabrook at I.S. 44 and Sol Levine, Principal of John Dewey High
School, during a visit to the school in Brooklyn. Talking with
John C. Woodbury, Assistant to the Chancellor, was very helpful—
and his assistance in setting up the interviews was invaluable.
Also in fall, 1970, I went to Philadelphia and visited the
Parkway Project and Pennsylvania Advancement School. I spoke
briefly with John Bremer, then Director of Parkway, at a time when
his personal struggle with Mark Shedd was at its peak. I visited
a highly-publicized and emotional public school board meeting in
which the closing of Paxon School, the elementary component of
Parkway, was discussed.
In fall, 1971, I visited Pennsylvania Advancement School again
and spoke extensively with Saul Yanofsky, Director of Research. At
that time, shortly after the election of Frank Rizzo, I talked with
various Philadelphians about the prospects for the schools and the
imminent ousting of Superintendent Mark Shedd.
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Information on the Louisville Schools was derived from written
proposals from the district and from conversations with various
School of Education personnel who served as consultants to the dis-
trict. Similarly, I learned about METRO school in Chicago from
written documents about the school and from talking with Mike
Greenebaum at the School of Education who was with Urban Research, Inc.
when they set up the school with the Chicago Board of Education.
To learn about other system-wide strategies for change, I had
the opportunity in the fall of 1969 to visit Southwest Regional
Lab in Los Angeles. Members of the Washington Innovations Team have
made periodic visits to the School of Education. Several of the
innovative schools and programs, in fact, have given presentations
as part of the School of Education Marathon Weeks.
Chapter IV
Various articles, cited in Chapter IV, have provided information
on community free schools, mini-schools, and street academies. I also
had the opportunity to interview people directly involved with street
academies: William Smith, original Director of SASSI Prep, and Nat
Rutstein, closely associated with Harlem Prep. Students and teachers
from SASSI Prep also visited the School of Education during Marathons.
My primary source for information on Westside Study Center has
been Atron A. Gentry, founder and Director of the Center, and various
other people affiliated with Westside who are now at the School of
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Education. I also visited the Westside Study Center in Pasadena in
fall, 1969.
The highlight of ray research for Chapter IV came in a visit
in fall, 1970, to Sesame Street in New York City. Loretta Long,
"Susan” of S esame Str eet
,
spoke to me at length about the program
and invited me to visit the studio and watch a show in progress.
I also visited the Research Department at Children's Television
Workshop and talked with Evelyn Davis, Director of Utilization, and
Charley Smith, her assistant. (Mrs. Davis is now a Vice-President
of Children s Television Workshop and Mr. Smith is the new Director
of Utilization.)
Chapter V
A classic study of change theory is The Planning of Change bv
Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Second Edition, 1969). Louis M. Maguire has
published both a thorough (though discouraging) summary and analysis
of the literature on change and an annotated bibliography: "Observa-
tions and Analysis of the Literature on Change" and "An Annotated
Bibliography of the Literature on Change" (Philadelphia: Research
for Better Schools, Inc., June/July, 1970). The bravest attempt to
discuss change in schools is Seymour B. Sarason's The Culture of the
School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971)
.
But no research or theory on change is very helpful in discussing
urban education. For future research, a useful approach might be to
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study leadership and innovative structures on a small scale. Valuable
conclusions could be reached by studying, for example, how well suc-
cessful change strategists survive in new situations: Harvey Scribner
as both Superintendent of Teaneck and Chancellor of New York City
Schools; Neil Sullivan as both Superintendent of Berkeley and
Commissioner of Education in Massachusetts; Edythe Gaines as both
District Superintendent and Director of the Cooperative School Project
Atron Gentry as both founder of Westside Study Center and Director of
the Center for Urban Education at the University of Massachusetts.
Another first step might be to look at various innovative struc-
tures and investigate their impact in different settings: the
Parkway model which is now being implemented in half a dozen cities;
flexible scheduling at John Dewey and other urban high schools; the
federal Career Opportunities Program model for involving para-
professionals in urban schools in many different cities; and district-
wide bussing for total school integration on the Berkeley model.
The most important mandate for future research in urban educa-
tion is to build up the record of success studies and leave the
realm of "blaming the victims." By focusing on success, we can move
beyond the hopelessness of repeated failure and beyond the unsatis-
factory conclusion that poor and minority children can only achieve
successfully in integrated schools.
As Herbert Gans has pointed out, "...if the prime purpose of
research is the elimination of poverty, studies of the poor are not
the first order of business; they are much less important than studie's
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of the economy .. .They are also less important than studies of the
political, social, and cultural factors that permit the existence
of a poverty-stricken underclass." Most important, we need to look
closer at racism, social and economic injustice, and the roles
schools can play in alleviating those injustices and building "the
hope factor."

